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HOW FEDERALISM BUILT THE FBI,
SUSTAINED LOCAL POLICE,
AND LEFT OUT THE STATES
Daniel Richman and Sarah A. Seo*
This Article examines the endurance of police localism amid the improbable
growth of the FBI in the early twentieth century when the prospect of a centralized
law enforcement agency was anathema to the ideals of American democracy. It
argues that doctrinal accounts of federalism do not explain these paradoxical developments. By analyzing how the Bureau made itself indispensable to local police
departments rather than encroaching on their turf, the Article elucidates an operational, or collaborative, federalism that not only enlarged the Bureau’s capacity
and authority but also strengthened local autonomy at the expense of the states.
Collaborative federalism is crucial for understanding why the police have gone for
so long without meaningful state or federal oversight, with consequences still confronting the country today. This history highlights how structural impediments to
institutional accountability have been set over time and also identifies a path not
taken, but one that can still be pursued, to expand the states’ supervisory role over
local police.
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INTRODUCTION
George Floyd’s death at the hands of a police officer in May 2020 set off
protests throughout the country, and we continue to reckon with a long history
of police abuse and violence and the lack of accountability of responsible officers
and police departments. Federalism is often blamed for this failure. Law enforcement has been a local matter since the colonial era and, still today, police departments remain largely resistant to federal oversight, especially on matters concerning racial justice. For its part, the U.S. Justice Department’s infrequent use
of its statutory authority to investigate police agencies that engage in a “pattern
or practice” of constitutional violations and of conditional grants to push police
reform reveals a lack of political will to encroach on local domains.1
Yet, federalism doesn’t explain why the states themselves have not supervised the police more. While direct federal control of police officers would violate the constitutional system of dual sovereignty according to Printz v. United
States,2 states do have the power to regulate the police but, for the most part, have
chosen not to. The limited, too often lacking, responses of governors to police
shootings make this point all too clear. Moreover, doctrinal accounts of federalism that maintain clear boundaries between local and federal spheres do not explain a paradoxical development in American law enforcement over the twentieth century: the remarkable growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI
or Bureau3) amid the persistence of localism. This history is especially puzzling
given that, during the Bureau’s first fifty years or so, from 1908 to 1960, it devoted a significant portion—in many years a lion’s share—of its caseload to investigating one particular crime: auto theft.4 What were the implications of the
federal government’s sustained involvement in the pursuit of theft, a traditionally
local matter?
This Article argues that formal notions of federalism do not capture the relationship between the Bureau and police departments. By examining the actual,
on-the-ground workings of American law enforcement and focusing specifically

1. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 103-322).
2. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-23 (1997).
3. For narrative ease, we use “Bureau” to refer to the agency called, at various times, the

“Division of Investigation,” the “Bureau of Investigation,” and the “Federal Bureau of Investigation” (from 1935 on).
4. See Part II.A and tables.
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on the joint pursuit of auto theft, this Article elucidates an operational, or collaborative, federalism that explains how the Bureau became an integral part of the
criminal justice ecosystem5 while preserving local autonomy and sidelining the
states in the policing realm.6 This account is crucial for understanding how the
police have gone without either state or federal oversight for so long, with consequences still confronting the country today. It helps to explain why raciallyinflected police practices, such as civil forfeiture and excessive criminal fines
and fees, have proliferated without significant scrutiny until only recently.7 By
highlighting how structural impediments to institutional accountability have
been set over time, this history can also identify ways of clearing those obstacles,
which will better inform our efforts to transform law enforcement to be more just
and equitable.
This historical account proceeds in three parts. Part I begins in the first two
decades of the twentieth century, a period of immense social changes that created
new law enforcement imperatives. Before then, police obtained information
about crimes and criminals by patrolling and talking with citizens in their beat.8
But at the turn of the century, especially when mass-produced automobiles gave
individuals unprecedented mobility, local law enforcement increasingly needed
information from outside their jurisdictions. This not only compelled police reformers to seek national solutions to crime, but it also persuaded Congress to
enact laws criminalizing traditionally local crimes that crossed state boundaries.
Part II then examines how police departments and the Bureau collaborated to
overcome their jurisdictional or resource constraints. It focuses on the enforcement of the Dyer Act, one of the new federal laws, which criminalized the transportation of stolen vehicles across state lines. Part II also examines the National
Division of Identification and Information, which served as a centralized clearinghouse for crime-related information, to further illustrate the Bureau’s collaborative relationship with local police. Finally, Part III explores the federalism

5. We use “ecosystem” to capture the multiple actors and institutions engaged in policing work, with various degrees of interaction. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the Criminal
Justice System, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55 (2018).
6. Our historical account provides further support for what Heather Gerken has called
the “nationalist school of federalism,” which highlights how federalism can actually advance
nationalist ends. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889, 1891 (2014); see also Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I,
123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2093 (2014) (“Federalism . . . has always been the United States’ distinctive species of nationalism.”).
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL
2-11 (2018); Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeiture, in 4 REFORMING CRIM. JUST.:
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION AND RELEASE 205 (Eric Luna ed., 2017); Developments in the
Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1728 (2015).
8. Christopher Thale, The Informal World of Police Patrol, 33 J. URB. HIST. 183, 18387 (2007); RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 60 (1921); Roger Lane, Urban
Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, 15 CRIME & JUST.: MOD. POLICING 1, 9
(1992).
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implications of our story. The working relationship of mutual exchange, or collaborative federalism, rendered the federal government largely unwilling to hold
the police accountable for how they performed their jobs. It also allowed local
police departments to retain considerable independence from state governments.
Ultimately, collaborative federalism, which is missing in formal accounts of federalism that subsume local agency into state authority, facilitated the Bureau’s
growth by privileging its local counterparties.
While this Article does not attempt to offer a complete account of why police
have been largely free from state or federal oversight, it identifies a critical historical moment when the result could have been different. By pointing out a road
not taken, this history suggests that it is not too late to turn around.
I. TOWARDS NATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO CRIME IN AN (AUTO)MOBILE SOCIETY
Profound transformations in American society at the turn of the century necessitated national solutions to crime, which had always been handled locally.
Part I.A examines the efforts of reforming police chiefs, and Part I.B turns to
Congress. But because the country was not yet ready to set aside its ideological
opposition to a centralized police force, law enforcement adaptations during the
years straddling the turn of the century reflected Martha Derthick’s observation
that Americans have “moved paradoxically both to centralize and decentralize.”9
Local law enforcement leaders and Congress established national institutions
like the National Police Bureau and the Bureau of Investigation, respectively, but
both establishments depended on local policing.
A. Police chiefs seek federal assistance
Since the colonial era, crime control in the United States was a local matter
and often prosecuted privately.10 Victims—either the individuals themselves or
9. MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 10 (2001). See also GARY GERSTLE, LIBERTY AND COERCION: THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 93 (2015) (describing the “improvisational” nature of America’s state-building in response to the “governing challenges of
the industrial age”).
10. J. Edgar Hoover reminisced in 1925 (although not from much personal experience):

In times past (and not so far distant past) crime or the criminal was a more or less
local issue. Our local or neighborhood criminal was known, his haunts could be
watched, his associates shadowed, the method and nature of the crime often bore
within itself the recognizable identity of the criminal. He could often be captured
on the scene of the crime, the fastest means of locomotion being either human or
equine. Then, too, his means of travel, which were limited, could be traced with
comparative ease. Should he escape to some other community, the danger of his
capture was still imminent. Every stranger was a marked man, every newcomer
aroused suspicion.
1925 Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

ANNUAL CONVENTIONS

OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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their insurance companies who were on the hook for reimbursing stolen goods—
investigated and pursued charges against perpetrators, who often could not flee
very far before the advent of motorized vehicles and better roads. Certainly, train
travel enabled jurisdiction skipping, but at a frequency and scale that hired investigators could manage.
Beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, both aspects of crime
control—local and private enforcement—were changing. By the 1880s, all of the
major US cities had established municipal police forces that were slowly but increasingly focusing on crime control and prevention.11 According to historian
Eric Monkkonen, 1894 was “the turning point, the moment when police began
to respond more directly to crimes of violence as measured by murder arrests.”12
Professionalized officers sought to proactively stop criminals before they could
commit their misdeeds rather than wait for a privately sworn arrest warrant or
for a crime to unfold in their presence before taking action. Such preventive policing required knowledge not just of illicit plans, but also of potential criminals,
which, in turn, depended on knowledge of their identities and histories.13
At the same time, however, Americans’ increased mobility, aided first by
locomotive trains and then mass-produced cars, made it difficult for local police
departments to keep track of habitual offenders. (Auto)mobility also expanded
the scope of criminal activities.14 Train travel made it increasingly possible, for
instance, for residents of a dry locale to buy alcohol from a neighboring wet jurisdiction, prompting reformers to impose prohibition first at the state level and
then nationally.15 The automotive revolution in transportation—from 1895 to
1929, the number of cars exploded from the single digits to more than 23 million—magnified the challenges to law enforcement.16
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1921-1925, VOL. 4, at 49 (New York, 1971); see also 1926
Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1926-1930, VOL. 5, at 56 (New York, 1971) (“Crime of
yesterday, accordingly, was an entirely local matter—a Main street affair.”); NICHOLAS R.
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 259-61 (2013) (describing private prosecutions in Philadelphia
during the 19th century); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 80-83, 149, 185-86, 205, 222, 224-25, 228 (1989) (describing
the rise and decline of private prosecution in Philadelphia).
11. John A. Fairlie, Police Administration, 16 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 7-8 (1901); FOSDICK, supra
note 8, at 58-117; Lane, supra note 8, at 15. For an insightful account of how increased mobility and challenges to the social order fostered the simultaneous development in the midnineteenth century of new public policing structures and a robust private security industry, see
JONATHAN OBERT, THE SIX-SHOOTER STATE 105 (2018).
12. Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST.: MOD. POLICING
547, 556 (1992).
13. See Pamela Sankar, State Power and Record-Keeping: History of Individualized Surveillance in the United States, 1790-1935, at 125-35 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania) (on file with authors).
14. See SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD 117-18 (2019).
15. See RICHARD HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL
CULTURE, AND THE POLITY (1995).
16. See SEO, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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Cars not only provided a getaway for the commission of age-old crimes like
bank robberies, kidnapping, and murder, they also created a new crime: auto
theft.17 The prominent criminal law scholar Jerome Hall may have found it “quite
extraordinary that theft of automobiles should be of particular importance,” but
he recognized that the phenomenon “loom[ed] up in unique importance.”18 Striking the same note, a congressman from Missouri declared in 1919 that there was
“no class of criminal enjoying more lucrative gain as a reward for their industry
than the automobile thieves of the country.”19 Although mass production made
cars much more affordable to a wider class of consumers, they were still among
the most valuable assets for the average family. Motor cars were expensive
enough and sufficiently necessary in many parts of the country to support a thriving market for secondhand cars. Standardized cars with standardized parts facilitated this secondary market, as did the automobile manufacturers’ disinclination
to develop either locking devices or ways of identifying cars and confirming
ownership.20
Crossing county, state, and even national boundaries became more frequent,
and sophisticated auto theft rings took advantage of the variegated landscape in
a federal system of government. They would steal cars in one state and sell them
in another where there was no record of the thefts.21 Operations near the Mexican
or Canadian border were especially cunning. During National Prohibition, bootleggers would steal a car in New York, drive to Canada, and sell it there. They
could use the proceeds of the sale to purchase liquor in Canada, then steal another
car, and transport the illicit goods back to the States, where they could sell the
alcohol and the stolen car and make a tidy profit.22 A more recreational pattern,
decried in California, was the “great spring drive”; according to the Los Angeles
Times, thieves stole “the cars they intend to drive East with the coming of the
first warm weather” and sold them when they got there.23 In 1926, the Chicago
Daily Tribune noted these developments: while crime used to be “a local affair”
when criminals “operated locally and disposed of their loot locally,” “[t]oday
crime is a national affair, run on interstate lines, made so by the railroads and the
automobile, principally the latter.”24
17. Id. at 96, 99-104, 117-18.
18. JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 230-31 (1935); see generally United States

v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413 (1957) (citing Hall when interpreting what “stolen” means under
the Dyer Act).
19. 58 CONG. REC. 5474 (1919)
20. SEO, supra note 14, at 100-103.
21. As Hoover reported in 1926, “We have bands of automobile thieves who steal machines in one state and pass them over to another band in another state to sell them.” 1926
Proceeding, supra note 10, at 56.
22. FRED J. SAUTER, THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE THEFT BUREAU 5
(1949).
23. Plan to Stop Car Stealing: Auto Club Considering Several Recommendations, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 1920, at VI1 (noting that “[l]enient jail sentences . . . make auto thieving a
pastime here.”).
24. The Interstate Commerce of Crime, CHI. DAILY TRIBUNE, June 17, 1926, at 10.
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Notwithstanding these changes, crime control remained mostly local during
the automobile’s early years. Even in the first decades of the twentieth century,
private groups continued to take on criminal investigations. When a vehicle was
stolen, hapless owners would contact local authorities. But they also posted a
reward for the recovery of their cars or, if they had auto theft insurance, had their
insurers post it. Citizens and businesses soon came together in common cause.
As Congressman Newman of Missouri observed, “[s]o frightful has this menace
[auto theft] become that automobile clubs and automobile protective associations
have been formed, and they have been joined by chambers of commerce and
commercial clubs all over the country in an effort to stamp out this lawless industry.”25
During this period of transition, citizens and private associations, as well as
state and local governments, were quickly discovering their limits in a multijurisdictional country. Law officers whose authority covered only a single jurisdiction could not pursue bootleggers and highway robbers. The mobility of criminals also gave rise to the need to share information about runaways, fugitives,
arrestees, prisoners, and parolees.26 As one police chief observed, “professional
thieves are constantly moving from one locality to another, one city to another,
one State to another. These professionals make circuits and become national
characters, traveling and depredating here, there, and everywhere.”27
These social changes brought about by the mass production of the automobile, as well as urban police departments’ increasing focus on crime control,
prompted forty-seven progressive police chiefs to form the National Chiefs of
Police Union in 1893 with the goal of improving “the detection and prevention
of crime in the United States.”28 As its president explained in 1895, the organization arose from the “constant telegraphic correspondence” among “the police
departments of the larger cities,” whose leaders recognized that “the effectiveness of one department depends upon the police system of other cities.”29 In an
increasingly mobile world, they realized, local knowledge that remained local
stymied investigations and preventive policing.
One of the Union’s first agenda items was to create “the National Police
Bureau” for “the practical exchange of ideas and information pertaining to police

25. 58 CONG. REC. 5474 (1919).
26. See To Create a National Police Bureau, To Create a Bureau of Criminal Identifi-

cation: Hearing on H.R. 8580 and H.R. 8409 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 6 (1924) (statement of NYC police commissioner) (explaining how a fugitive could
commit crimes in several states without each state being aware of it).
27. A Bill for the Creation of a National Bureau of Criminal Identification, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS
OF POLICE, 1893-1905, VOL. 1, at 20 (New York, 1971).
28. Chiefs of Police Coming, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1895, at 8. See also Sankar, supra
note 13, at 124-125.
29. 1895 Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1893-1905, VOL. 1, at 9 (New York, 1971).
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business.”30 In the beginning, that information focused on the identities of perpetrators based on the Bertillon system, developed in the 1880s, which relied on
measurements from head to toe “based on the principle that no two adult creatures are alike.”31 By the early 1900s, the organization, renamed the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in recognition of the need to communicate with police agencies in foreign countries as well, set up a “bureau of criminal
identification” and began collecting fingerprints.32 But the dues, about $25 a
year, gathered from the 200 departments or so were insufficient to pay for the
distribution of that information.33 Also, without a critical mass of participating
police departments or a central database available to law enforcement throughout
the country, the effectiveness of the IACP’s bureau was limited.
One possible solution was to establish information-sharing arrangements
among the states, but that proved difficult in a federal system. The lack of stateto-state cooperation even where constitutionally mandated by the Extradition
Clause, and the commons problem of state funding for such arrangements, presented nearly insurmountable obstacles. The fact that public and private institutions at the municipal or county levels were the real sites of criminal enforcement
didn’t help either. These were the very years in which the states’ authority over
urban police forces, according to police expert Raymond Fosdick, “fell before
the demands of the cities that they be allowed to handle their own affairs even if
they handled them badly.”34 Moreover, the states themselves were not involved
in the policing project; the first statewide police force was not established until
1905, when Pennsylvania formed one to replace industry muscle in labor disputes.35 Given the states’ minimal presence in law enforcement and their inability
to surmount coordination problems, the IACP never even approached the states
for help in creating an infrastructure for the exchange of crime-related information.
Instead, local police chiefs asked the federal government for assistance.
Clearly, formal federalism, which assigned police functions to local governments, did not concern them as much as their practical needs. In 1901, the IACP

30. Chiefs of Police Coming, supra note 28.
31. 1902 Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1893-1905, VOL. 1, at 18 (New York,
1971).
32. To Create a National Police Bureau, To Create a Bureau of Criminal Identification:
Hearing on H.R. 8580 and H.R. 8409 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 33
(1924).
33. Id. at 7, 21, 24, 67.
34. FOSDICK, supra note 8, at 100.
35. See Paul Musgrave, Bringing the State Police In: The Diffusion of U.S. Statewide
Policing Agencies, 1905–1941, 34 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 3, 8 (2020) (noting that “establishment of the Pennsylvania State Police in 1905 directly derived from the abuses of the Coal &
Iron Police (paid for by industry) and local law enforcement’s inability to cope with that dispute”); Margaret Mary Corcoran, State Police in the United States: A Bibliography, 14 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1924) (“Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the form of
armed and mounted force now known as state constabulary . . . .”).
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drafted a bill for Congress to establish “a National Bureau of Criminal Identification in connection with the Department of Justice” that would collect “plates,
photographs, outline pictures, descriptions, information, and measurements of all
persons who have been or may be convicted and imprisoned” for violating any
laws of the United States and its “several States and Territories, or the [] municipalities thereof.”36 To convince Congress to pay for the new DOJ bureau, the
IACP pledged that “the Government would receive a full reciprocal amount of
aid and information” on federal crimes from local departments.37 “The whole
arrangement,” it envisioned, “would constitute one great web which the malefactor could not elude, and bring the authorities everywhere, Government and
State, into full sympathy and co-operation, the Government being amply repaid
for the small expenditure.”38
Many in Congress supported the idea. The House Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the bill, even lifting phrases directly from the IACP’s bill to
conclude that not only would the creation of “one great web which the malefactor
could not elude” benefit the states, but that the federal government could also be
“amply repaid for the small expenditure.”39 The report pointed out that with identification information, police authorities throughout the country could help find
military deserters. Moreover, the heads of the Secret Service, the Post Office,
and the federal penitentiaries all gave “favorable and unqualified indorsement
[sic]” because such a national bureau would place them “in closer touch with the
police authorities, and a thorough cooperation [would] follow.”40
But those in opposition prevailed.41 The Senate Judiciary Committee “reported adversely” on the bill, which was thereafter “postponed indefinitely.”42
The absence of a report keeps us from knowing its reasoning. But the House’s
report, which insisted defensively that it was “not proposed that the bureau shall
be a detective agency,” provides some clues.43 A federal agency that compiled
criminal identification information that could potentially be used to spy on its
citizens would, some feared, come too close to a national police force, which was
antithetical to American freedom.44 Federal criminal interventions were also po-

36. 1902 Proceeding, supra note 31, at 14-15; see also 35 CONG. REC. 5870 (1902)
(statement of Rep. Jenkins). See generally S. DOC. NO. 56-43 (1900) (letter from Richard Sylvester, Mayor and Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Department, to Senator George
G. Vest, Urging Legislation Looking to the Establishment in Washington City of a Bureau to
be Known as the National Bureau of Criminal Identification).
37. 1902 Proceeding, supra note 31, at 19.
38. Id.
39. NATIONAL BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, H.R. REP. NO. 57-429, at 3 (1902).
40. Id.
41. See Mary M. Stolberg, Policing the Twilight Zone: Federalizing Crime Fighting
During the New Deal, 7 J. POL’Y HIST. 393, 395-396 (1995), on opposition to Bureau creation.
42. 57 CONG. REC. 1226 (1902).
43. See NATIONAL BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, H.R. REP. NO. 57-429, at 4
(1902).
44. See MAX LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 3-4 (1951).

430

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[17:421

litically fraught, especially in the South, where concerns that the feds would undermine Jim Crow ran deep.45 For these reasons, the United States did not have
a general investigative force. The Justice Department, not created until 1870, was
responsible for the prosecution of a relatively narrow range of cases that came
mostly from the Departments of Treasury and Post Office.46 Investigations, to
the extent they occurred, were pursued by private detectives or Secret Service
agents borrowed from the Treasury Department.47 Because centralized police
forces were anathema, the proposal for a National Bureau would languish for
another two decades, and the IACP would continue to maintain its own voluntary
network of information sharing.
B. Congress creates the Bureau and new federal crimes
Given its refusal to adopt the IACP’s bill, it’s unsurprising that Congress
also balked at the proposal submitted in 1907 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte (the Emperor’s grand-nephew) to establish a “permanent detective
force.”48 Not only did Congress reject Bonaparte’s proposal, but so strong was
its fear of a political police force that it also moved to preclude the Department’s
use of Secret Service agents. US Attorney for the Southern District of New York
Henry Stimson worried that this move could destroy the “fighting power of his
office.”49
After Congress adjourned for the summer, Bonaparte, encouraged by President Theodore Roosevelt, reached into DOJ funds and quietly created an investigative unit.50 The following year, in 1909, Congress post facto authorized the
45. See generally ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876 (John H.
Baker et al. eds., 2005); ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, A FREE BALLOT AND A FAIR COUNT: THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1877–1893
(2001); Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in
Northern Mississippi, 1870-1890, 53 J. S. HIST. 421 (1987); Gautham Rao, The Federal
“Posse Comitatus” Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century
America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2008); Scott C. James & Brian L. Lawson, The Political Economy of Voting Rights Enforcement in America’s Gilded Age: Electoral College Competition,
Partisan Commitment, and the Federal Election Law, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (1999); Wilbur R. Miller, The Revenue: Federal Law Enforcement in the Mountain South, 1870-1900, 55
J. S. HIST. 195 (1989); Jonathan Obert, A Fragmented Force: The Evolution of Federal Law
Enforcement in the United States, 1870-1900, 29 J. POL’Y HIST. 640 (2017).
46. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 114-121 (1905).
47. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 92 (1906).
48. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1907).
49. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 376 (1937).
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 8-10 (1909); see also John Allen Noakes, Enforcing Domestic Tranquility:
State Building and the Origin of the (Federal) Bureau of Investigation, 1908-1920, at 72-85
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Bureau of Investigation after its members were shamed for opposing a federal
law enforcement agency in the middle of an unfolding congressional scandal.51
But it received assurances that the Bureau would not become a spy force and
would simply support the rather narrow criminal mission of the Justice Department.52 As Bonaparte told Congress, “the detective force which minds its own
business, and attends to that, and does nothing else, is more effective as a means
of suppressing crime than one which is used for any extraneous purpose.”53
Given that the Bureau lacked arrest powers, its ancillary status could not have
been clearer.
Although the Bureau was created when federal criminal laws were few in
number,54 the exigencies of an (auto)mobile society soon led to a spate of criminal legislation. In 1910, Congress passed the Mann Act, which criminalized the
interstate transportation of any “woman or girl” for “prostitution or debauchery,
or for any other immoral purpose.”55 Four years later in 1914 came the Harrison
Anti-Narcotics Act and another five years later, in 1919, the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (the Dyer Act), which criminalized the interstate transportation
of stolen vehicles.56 That same year, the nation ratified the Eighteenth Amendment to end the production, shipment, and sale of alcohol and, in 1920, the Volstead Act put National Prohibition into effect.57 These new laws stretched longestablished bounds of federalism by involving the national government in conventionally local matters, a development made necessary by an increasingly mobile world.58

(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), https://perma.cc/AVC5WFHN; David Joseph Williams, Without Understanding: The FBI and Political Surveillance,
1908-1941 at 32 (1981) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Hampshire),
https://perma.cc/6F3W-RHZX (maintaining that “at no time” did congressional critics “advance their proposals to protect themselves from possible criminal investigation.”).
51. LOWENTHAL, supra note 44, at 10. See also CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note
49, at 377; Noakes, supra note 50, at 80-85.
52. Fears that the Bureau would become a roving spy force, like the Pinkerton National
Detective Agency, at the service of the powerful likely loomed large. See David A. Sklansky,
The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1213-16 (1999) (describing hostility to Pinkertons
in Congress and elsewhere during the 1890s); see also Robert P. Weiss, Private Detective
Agencies and Labour Discipline in the United States, 1855-1946, 29 HIST. J. 87 (1986);
Charles K. Hyde, Undercover and Underground: Labor Spies and Mine Management in the
Early Twentieth Century, 60 BUS. HIST. REV. 1 (1986).
53. Aaron Stockham, Lack of Oversight: The Relationship Between Congress and the
FBI, 1907-1975, at 57 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University),
https://perma.cc/HT49-B7S9 (quoting Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910: Hearings Before Subcomm. of H. Comm. on Appropriations, 60th Cong. 1033 (1909) (statement of Charles
Bonaparte, Attorney General)).
54. See DANIEL C. RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 3 (2d ed. 2019).
55. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910). (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2018)).
56. Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914); National Motor Vehicle Theft (Dyer) Act,
ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324 (1919) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312 (2006)).
57. H.R. REP. NO. 66-151, at 1 (1919).
58. The new federal criminal laws also showed how notions of racial threat that generally
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Criminal laws, however, don’t enforce themselves. So to enforce the new
statutes, Congress appropriated more money to federal agencies, especially the
Justice Department, but it was never enough. As a result, the DOJ and its Bureau
could pursue their assignments only with collaborations with state and local
agencies and—in an era when citizens shared the task of investigation and prosecution—with the help of private organizations. World War I, for example, saw
a massive citizen mobilization that supplemented local police and federal law
enforcement. Volunteers from the American Protective League (APL) reported
subversive activities and enforced alien registration, and their “slacker raids” resulted in the detention of tens of thousands of draft-age citizens, often at bayonet
point.59 President Woodrow Wilson had reservations about the APL’s involve-

reinforced Southern hostility to federal authority could be deployed to counsel just such authority—so long as it would be mediated by local officials. Nativist concerns about immigrant
prostitutes were crucial in passing the Mann Act. See JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY:
THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 65-70 (2014) (explaining the origins of the Mann
Act). To get the critical votes of Southern Democrats for the Harrison Act, State Department
officials strategically (and disingenuously) stressed how cocaine peculiarly affected AfricanAmericans and thus posed a special threat to whites. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN
DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 43-44 (3d ed. 1999); Michael M. Cohen, Jim Crow’s
Drug War: Race, Coca Cola, and the Southern Origins of Drug Prohibition, 12 S. CULTURES
55, 76-77 (2006); see also Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing
the Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 736 (1953) (explaining that the Harrison Act,
although ostensibly required by a treaty obligation, was intended “mainly to aid the states in
combatting a local police problem which had gotten somewhat out of hand”). Similarly, support of Prohibition in the South depended on its framing as “the solution to black savagery.”
JOE L. COKER, LIQUOR IN THE LAND OF THE LOST CAUSE: SOUTHERN WHITE EVANGELICALS
AND THE PROHIBITION MOVEMENT 124 (2007).
Conversely, racially motivated Southern hostility blocked a long effort by the NAACP
for anti-lynching legislation. See MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE (2014); Jeffrey A. Jenkins et al., Between Reconstructions:
Congressional Action on Civil Rights, 1891-1940, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 57, 66-77 (2010);
George C. Rable, The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940, 51 J. S.
HIST. 201(1985). Critical aspects of the anti-lynching bill—which included a five-year mandatory minimum for state or municipal officials who conspired in the lynching of a prisoner
in his custody, H.R. REP. NO. 67-452, at 1 (1921)—were technically covered by an existing
statute that was not enforced, which only highlights Southern antipathy to the measure. Later,
Attorney General Biddle rejected the notion that “existing statutes were totally impotent to
deal with lynching of prisoners in state custody” and advised President Roosevelt on July 21,
1942, that “many lynchings, upon investigation, would prove to involve violations of existing
federal statutes.” Frank Coleman, Freedom from Fear on the Home Front, 29 IOWA L. REV.
415, 425 (1944); see John T. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual
Rights, 1937-1962, at 93-111 (1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (discussing
Civil Rights Section’s 1940 reconsideration of existing statutory authority to prosecute civil
rights crimes). But these cases often ended in acquittals. See Coleman, supra, at 423 (noting
“acquittals in addition to those resulting from failure of proof, can be expected where the federal government seeks to prosecute for crimes traditionally deemed the sole concern of the
state or local community.”).
59. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
165-166 (2d ed. 2004); REGIN SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF
ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1919-1943, at 84 (2000); Williams, supra note 50,
at 95-97; CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE
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ment, but his attorney general persuaded him “that the assistance of APL volunteers was the only way the Bureau could meet the rush of war-time work without
adding unduly to the permanent federal bureaucracy.”60 This was so even with
soaring congressional appropriations from 1916 to 1919.61
Thereafter, during National Prohibition, a volunteer-citizen army, which included the Ku Klux Klan, again assisted federal enforcers. Yet volunteers could
not make up for lackadaisical local law enforcement. Even though the Prohibition Bureau was more than four times the size of the Bureau of Investigation,62
its head declared that his Prohibition agents could fulfill their task only with “the
closest cooperation between the Federal officers and all other law-enforcing officers—State, county, and municipal.”63 But cooperation did not materialize. According to one observer, even the helpful police agencies soon “began to show
signs of lagging interest which in time developed into indifference.”64 While severe over-enforcement had marked the wartime campaign, severe underenforcement plagued a morals crusade that more often provoked hostility than patriotic
feeling.
Without sustained cooperation from local partners, not only would the federal government’s enforcement efforts be left in disarray, but the very legitimacy
of Prohibition could be compromised.65 Canute-like, the national government
tried doctrinal arguments to mandate support. In the face of local intransigence,
President Coolidge argued that the Eighteenth Amendment put “a concurrent
duty on the States.”66 The Commissioner of Prohibition likewise insisted that
there was “no doubt” that states were required “to exercise in their appropriate
sphere of action the full police powers of the State, in order to properly discharge
their obligations under the Eighteenth Amendment.”67 But many states and local
governments, particularly in large cities, ignored these claims.68 New York City
police, many from ethnic, working-class communities that viewed Prohibition as
an indictment against their way of life, neither cared to assist the feds nor were

MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN (2008)
60. Noakes, supra note 50, at 168.
61. Id. at 159.
62. LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL 208 (2016).
63. Robert Post, Federalism, Positivism, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (2006) (quoting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
64. Albert E. Sawyer, The Enforcement of National Prohibition, 163 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. SOC. SCI. 10, 23 (1932).
65. Some locales cooperated. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s first Prohibition car-search
case, Carroll v. United States, came out of a joint investigation by federal agents and an officer
from Michigan’s Department of Public Safety. See 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also SEO, supra
note 14, at 113-15.
66. President Calvin Coolidge, Third Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1925).
67. Post, supra note 63, at 31 (quoting Commissioner of Prohibition James M. Doran).
68. See Julien Comte, “Let the Federal Men Raid”: Bootlegging and Prohibition Enforcement in Pittsburgh, 77 PA. HIST. J. MID-ATL. STUD. 166, 174 (2010) (discussing police
refusal to assist prohibition agents in Pittsburgh).
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inclined to obey the law themselves.69 Even after the Anti-Saloon League, another voluntarist organization, successfully lobbied for the Mullan-Gage Enforcement Law in New York, which squarely obliged the police to participate in
the Prohibition project, many officers still dragged their feet or took bribes.70
Without state and local participation, Prohibition was doomed to failure.71 In
1922, New Yorkers voted out Governor Nathan Miller, who had given them the
Mullan-Gage Law, and replaced him with Al Smith, a committed “wet.”72 The
new governor quickly won repeal of the state’s Prohibition enforcement statute,
citing authorities who described the Eighteenth Amendment as “not a command
but an option.”73 The New York example foreshadowed what might happen
throughout the country.
By contrast, enforcement of the Mann Act provided an example of a fruitful
relationship between federal and local actors, precisely because, unlike Prohibition cases, local enforcement preferences largely dovetailed with the federal mission. Stanley Finch, the Bureau’s first chief, who became the special commissioner for the Mann Act in 1912, established a vast network of local, part-time,
and minimally compensated “white-slave” officers, usually local lawyers.74 Together, they obtained more than 300 convictions between September 1912 and
September 1913 alone.75 Local support also rebutted claims that the federal government was meddling in a presumptively local matter. An early challenge,
which “condemn[ed the Mann Act] as a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere
with the police power of the states to regulate the morals of their citizens,” lost
in the Supreme Court.76 The police themselves saw no troubling intrusion, just
an opportunity for collaboration. At the 1913 IACP convention, President Richard H. Sylvester touted the extensive cooperation between the Bureau and locals.
He noted that in his own jurisdiction of Washington, DC, “several” cases had

69. MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY, 72-75
(2007).
70. Id. at 76-77, 82
71. See ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH, CRIME CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 54
(1937) (“Certain of the states failed to assume their share of the task and shifted the distasteful
burden to the broad but slightly stooping shoulders of Uncle Sam. Prohibition leaders, misled
by unwarranted faith in the omnipotence of federal enforcement, abandoned the localized
methods which had gradually created a substantial temperance sentiment.”).
72. LERNER, supra note 69, at 239-240.
73. Alfred E. Smith, The Governor’s Statement, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1923. See also
LERNER, supra note 69, at 239-240.
74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 48 (1912); Jessica R. Pliley, The FBI’s White Slave Division: The Creation of a National Regulatory Regime to Police Prostitutes in the United States, 1910-1918, in GLOBAL
ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM, 1890-1950: FIGHTING DRINKS, DRUGS AND “IMMORALITY” 221, 230
(Jessica R. Pliley et al. eds., 2016); PLILEY, supra note 58, at 89; DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING
OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 55-56 (1994).
75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1913).
76. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321 (1913).
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been “disposed of by the United States authorities and the police have been foremost in bringing them to the front.”77
Scholars have pointed to the Mann Act or the Volstead Act as turning points
in the federalization of law enforcement.78 Yet one should avoid conflating legislation with enforcement. The enforcement of these new laws actually highlights
federal dependency. A perennially resource-strapped federal agency, by depending on support from citizens, paid a price when it came to the control of its
agenda. Without a sufficient force of its own, Finch’s team depended on whatever information they received about potential Mann Act violations. Notwithstanding the Bureau’s desire to focus on commercial prostitution and to avoid
policing morals, complaints of sexual misbehavior necessarily determined the
Bureau’s caseload.79 Women seeking redress against lovers who spurned them,
parents wanting to control daughters, and judgmental neighbors all saw the Mann
Act as their tool.80 Given the drumbeat of these civilian complaints and calls from
reformers demanding prosecution, it is not surprising that Mann Act cases
skewed toward immoral behavior and less toward interstate prostitution rings
that were harder to investigate.81 Dependence on others for information deprived
77. 1913 Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1913-1920, VOL. 3, at 94 (New York,
1971).
78. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 897
(2005); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1142 (1995).
79. On private complaints and the Bureau’s desired focus on commercial prostitution,
see PLILEY, supra note 58, at 99. In her analysis of Mann Act cases, Pliley found that private
citizens, usually complaining about “their own familial catastrophes and marital calamities,”
initiated most of the noncommercial cases. Hoover himself suggested figures between 50 and
70 percent. Id. at 132. Noncommercial cases dominated the docket. McCoy’s review of every
available Mann Act case prosecuted in the Western United States from 1910 to the 1930s—
about 1,200—found that “a large proportion of cases came to the attention of authorities because family members, friends, and neighbors turned in people who behaved in what they saw
as an ‘immoral’ fashion.” Kelli Ann McCoy, Claiming Victims: The Mann Act, Gender, and
Class in the American West, 1910-1930s, at 22 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego), https://perma.cc/3NA5-755S; see id. at 117; see also Kelli
Ann McCoy, Regulating Respectable Manliness in the American West: Race, Class, and the
Mann Act, 1910-1940, 28 WESTERN LEGAL HIST. 1 (2015).
80. PLILEY, supra note 58, at 139 (“The Mann Act operated as a federal seduction law,
providing parents and victims a tool to use when the bounder who had promised marriage left
for another jurisdiction.”).
81. McCoy, Claiming Victims, supra note 79, at 207 (noting that “between 1910 and
1917, prosecutions progressed slowly and inconsistently along the path from commercial prosecutions—those cases most closely resembling ‘white slavery’—to noncommercial prosecutions.”); see also LANGUM, supra note 74, at 68 (noting pressure from “the public, zealous
prosecutors, and the courts themselves” to expand prosecutions to include noncommercial violations involving consenting adults).
The now infamous targeting of boxer Jack Johnson in 1913 “was, undoubtedly, part of a
concerted effort to establish a particular racial and gender order in the United States,” but was
not representative of the Mann Act cases brought. See McCoy, Claiming Victims, supra note
79, at 157. The Bureau also turned to the Mann Act when targeting a central figure in the 1920
Ku Klux Klan resurgence. FRED COOK, THE FBI NOBODY KNOWS 124-26 (1964).
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the Bureau of agenda control, but the corollary was support for that agenda and
for the Bureau itself. When the willing collaboration of local police and citizens
was not forthcoming, as Prohibition authorities discovered, no realistically conceivable amount of federal funding could have supported the agencies tasked
with enforcement.82
Neither could the passions of a discrete contingent of crusaders sustain the
Bureau’s growth over a longer period. It quietly kept its distance from Prohibition enforcement and, once the white-slavery scare dissipated, the Bureau’s appropriations stagnated.83 National security work was similarly cyclical; in fact,
the Red Scare demonstrates its double-edged nature. On the one hand, helping
the war effort and going after radicals made the Bureau seem indispensable to
key national goals. On the other, the Bureau would regularly find that political
commitment to its national-security portfolio ebbed and flowed.84 The Armistice
was about to lead to a considerable reduction in the Bureau’s force until a series
of bombing attempts targeted administration officials, including the new Attorney General Mitchell Palmer.85 Notwithstanding the resulting hysteria, much of
it manufactured, the Bureau remained small.86 From 1919 to 1920, staff at headquarters numbered only thirty-one, and just sixty-one special agents worked in
the field full-time on radical activities.87 Given their paltry numbers, they had to
rely on local police forces in its many raids on strikers, anarchists, and communists.88 By fall of 1920, Republican President-elect Harding would declare
that “too much has been said about Bolshevism in America,” and budget strings
were tightened.89 Given the fickleness of political winds and congressional ambivalence about the Bureau’s work, especially during the civil-liberties backlash

82. See NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 95-96 (1931) (reporting “not
a little falling down of enforcement between concurrent agencies with diffused responsibility”
and “a feeling,” even in states with prohibition laws predating National Prohibition, that enforcement “was now a federal concern with which the state need no longer trouble itself.”).
83. Noakes, supra note 50, at 136.
84. At the height of the Red Scare, the US Attorney in Western Washington asked Attorney General Palmer “to stop pursuing futile cases [against labor radicals] and concentrate
on ‘the humdrum work developing and returning to this office evidence in the various criminal
cases here prosecuted.’” Id. at 229.
85. SCHMIDT, supra note 59, at 84 n.5, 149; see also BEVERLY GAGE, THE DAY WALL
STREET EXPLODED: THE STORY OF AMERICA IN ITS FIRST AGE OF TERROR, 178-179, 211-212
(2009) (discussing Palmer’s background and reaction to the bombing of his home, and on
Bureau theories).
86. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STEWARD COX, THE BOSS: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE
GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 55-57 (1988).
87. SCHMIDT, supra note 59, at 159.
88. Williams, supra note 50, at 121 & 145.
89. SCHMIDT, supra note 59, at 156, 300-01; THEOHARIS & COX, supra note 86, at 68
(“Hoover, lacking any independent political base, was forced for the time being to abandon
the field of public antiradicalism.”).
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over the excesses of the slacker raids,90 the Bureau’s longevity—and appropriations—would have to be based on a steadier stream of work that not only mattered to everyday life for ordinary citizens but also transcended politics du jour.91
II. COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM IN ACTION
As the divergent experiences with the Mann Act and the Volstead Act
demonstrated, the failure or success—and the nature of success—of federal law
enforcement ultimately depended on the cooperation of local, not state, actors
who had access to information and supplied manpower. For the Mann Act, the
nature of such cooperation shaped the federal docket. For the Volstead Act, the
absence of cooperation was fatal.
The Dyer Act, as this Part will show, gave the fledgling Bureau a steady
stream of cases to pursue—and an extraordinary opportunity for capacity building. Part II.A explains how the Bureau’s work on the Dyer Act offered police
and insurance companies a solution to the problem of gathering criminal information in the automotive age and what the Bureau received in exchange. Dyer
Act cases soon became the foundation for the relationship of mutual exchange
that developed between the Bureau and local police—a “collaborative federalism” that largely excluded state authorities. Part II.B then examines the parallel
story of other information-sharing projects that the Bureau pursued, which further illustrates collaborative federalism in action. By fostering cooperative alliances with local partners with these projects, the Bureau was able to expand its
capacity beyond its small size and to pursue the high-profile cases that the American public increasingly expected the federal government to solve. They also solidified the role of local police departments as indispensable federal interlocutors.
A. Enforcing the Dyer Act
1. What locals needed
Mass-produced cars appeared on Main Streets and interstate highways just
as reforming police chiefs were beginning to coordinate their activities. As they
quickly discovered, the decentralized organization of law enforcement was illsuited to pursue motorists who could flee a jurisdiction on a moment’s notice.
City or county governments were reluctant to spend money enlarging their police
departments to go hunting for criminals who might not fall entirely within their
purview. It also did not make sense as long as the pursuit and prosecution of
90. Noakes, supra note 50, at 201, 223-24. See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING
OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE

(2016).

91. See RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER 164 (1987) (noting that under Pres-

idents Coolidge and Hoover, J.E. Hoover “probably would have been happy to join an attack
on radicals if someone else with a strong political base had volunteered to lead it, but neither
then nor after was he interested in leading an anti-Communist crusade all by himself”).
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crime was largely a private responsibility.
As a result, insurance companies were at the front lines of fighting auto theft.
Their main strategy was to post reward notices within a certain geographic range,
usually within a radius of 150 miles or so from the point of theft since early cars
on bad roads could travel only so far.92 By 1912, a group of insurers decided to
economize their efforts by forming the American Protective and Information Bureau (APIB), which circulated a single report for all the stolen vehicles they insured and served as an information clearinghouse.93 Then in 1918, APIB manager E. L. Rickards and Michael Doyle, director of the American Automobile
Insurance Company in St. Louis, Missouri, came up with the idea of a national
law criminalizing the transportation of stolen vehicles in interstate traffic, believing that “Federal level involvement” would make a difference in combating the
problem.94 Conveniently, Doyle knew his congressman, Leonidas Dyer. The following year in 1919, Dyer introduced a bill “to punish the transportation of stolen
motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce.”95
The House’s discussion of the bill centered on the question: “How can a
Federal law punish a man for stealing an automobile?”96 After all, theft was a
local matter and already criminalized under local laws. The IACP, unsure
whether Congress had the power to criminalize auto theft, instead suggested that
the solution might be for all states to enact a uniform law, a common solution to
interstate problems during this period.97 But in the era of the Mann Act and National Prohibition—within three weeks of the House’s debate, Congress would
pass the Volstead Act to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment—most national legislators were persuaded that the federal government had the authority to criminalize the transport of stolen cars across state lines.98 One congressman argued
by analogy that “[i]f the transportation of a woman from one State to another, by
means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate commerce, then

92. NAT’L. AUTO. THEFT BUREAU, 75TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 6 (1987).
93. SAUTER, supra note 22, at 2-3; see also AMERICAN PROTECTIVE AND INFO. BUREAU,

ANNUAL REPORT 1920-1921, at 3 (1921) [hereinafter APIB 1920]. The APIB was one of those
national associations that, as historian Brian Balogh explains, soon came to “overlay” the federal structure, “thickening the opportunities for” cooperation beyond the local or regional and
“ultimately changing the very shape of federalism.” BRIAN BALOGH, THE ASSOCIATIONAL
STATE: AMERICAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 31-32 (2015).
94. NAT’L. AUTO. THEFT BUREAU, supra note 92, at 24; see APIB 1920, supra note 93,
at 1.
95. 66 CONG. REC. 5470 (1919).
96. 66 CONG. REC. 5473 (1919) (statement of Rep. Reavis).
97. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1918 Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 1913-1920
VOL. 3, at 29-31 (New York, 1971).
98. See 66 CONG. REC. 5471 (1919) (“The power of the Congress to enact this law and
to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State
can not [sic] be questioned, in view of laws of similar nature heretofore enacted by Congress
and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching same.”).
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how can it be argued, with any show of color, that the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another for profit is not interstate commerce?”99 Several
of his colleagues also pointed out that the “favorite place for such thefts is near
a State line.”100 Dyer maintained that auto thefts were “particularly” common in
the “cities of the Middle West,” especially in his home state Missouri, and that
“State laws upon the subject have been inadequate to meet the evil.”101 Chief
Justice Taft would repeat these arguments in 1924 to uphold the Dyer Act, writing that “[t]he quick passage of the machines”—as cars were often called then—
“into another state helps to conceal the trail of the thieves, gets the stolen property
into another police jurisdiction and facilitates the finding of a safer place in which
to dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a gross misuse of interstate commerce.”102
Dyer and Newton also argued that the new bill fell comfortably within interstate commerce in the more traditional sense by invoking the interests of the insurance industry. In the face of a high risk of loss, “almost every owner in the
land [held] a larceny policy.”103 But this was also why providing insurance
against auto theft proved to be a losing business proposition. “One of the reasons
why this legislation is needed so badly,” Dyer pointed out, was because “automobile theft insurance has advanced in the past year over 100 per cent on cars
costing from $500 to $900.”104 The economics of this situation especially affected ordinary citizens, for “cheaper cars are stolen,” making it “almost impossible for the owners of these cheaper cars to obtain at any rate automobile theft
insurance.”105 Given the recent precedents of the Mann Act and the Volstead Act,
as well as the broad reach of auto theft on the material lives of many citizens, it
took just one month for Dyer’s bill to become the National Motor Vehicle Theft
Act, or the Dyer Act, on October 29, 1919.
Congress, however, gave no thought to how the new law would be enforced.
The closest that legislators came to such a discussion was when Representative
Newton noted that with the new law, “the Federal grand jury is empowered to
investigate such larcenies.”106 Once the Dyer Act was passed, its enforcement

99. Id. at 5476.
100. Id. at 6433; see also id. at 5474.
101. Id. at 5470-71.
102. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 438-439 (1925). See also Kelly v. United

States, 277 F. 405 (4th Cir. 1921); Whitaker v. Hitt, 285 F. 797 (D.C. Cir. 1922); Katz v.
United States, 281 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1922); United States v. Winkler, 299 F. 832 (W.D. Tex.
1924); Hughes v. United States, 4 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1925).
103. 66 CONG. REC. 5475 (1919).
104. Id. at 5472. Lest one be tempted to attribute Dyer’s efforts solely to solicitude for
propertied interests and not, say, an expansive vision of the federal role in criminal enforcement, we note that Dyer—who represented a district that “included many African American
survivors from the violent East St. Louis race riot in 1917,” FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 101—
was “the strongest advocate of a federal anti-lynching program in Congress and the institutional voice for the NAACP,” Jenkins et al., supra note 58, at 67.
105. 66 CONG. REC. 5472 (1919).
106. Id. at 5475.
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appears to have been an open question. Two months after enactment, the Automobile Underwriters Detective Bureau wrote to the attorney general inquiring
“how a peace officer should proceed in making an arrest and prosecuting under
this Act.”107 Another insurance man wrote to the DOJ, “desirous of being sworn
in as a special agent . . . to serve without compensation for the purpose of running
down . . . thieves who have been . . . transporting cars from one state to another.”108 On the APIB’s part, its leaders were under the misapprehension that
US Marshals were supposed to be pursuing Dyer Act cases, and so were dismayed at the “laxity” that “existed on the part of the Federal Authorities in the
enforcement” of the new law.109
To make the most of their lobbying efforts, APIB manager Rickards and an
official from the Chicago Crime Commission met with Bureau Chief William
Burns and his assistant J. Edgar Hoover in 1921 “to discuss methods of closer
co-operation between the Department of Justice Agents and the Association
[and] more effectual enforcement of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.”110
Out of that meeting came clarification of the roles of the various stakeholders in
Dyer Act cases.111 For its part, the APIB would serve as “a clearing-house for
information in connection with stolen automobiles” and provide expertise on investigatory methods.112 For instance, it published the “Reference Book” that catalogued all the factory numbers and “secret identification numbers” stamped on
different car makes and models.113 The insurance cohort would also pass on reports of stolen vehicles from their claimholders to law enforcement. This role
was to be shared with local police departments whose officers discovered potential Dyer Act violations during their routine patrols.
For their part, the police did not hesitate to involve the feds. For one thing,
prosecutions were much easier to bring under the Dyer Act than under state larceny laws, which required proof of intent “to permanently deprive the owner of
his car” and, as a result, did not cover joyriding.114 Dyer Act violations were also
107. Letter from Harry M. Shedd, Automobile Underwriters Detective Bureau, to the
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 29, 1920) (on file with authors).
108. Letter from Frederick Lambert, Sec’y and Manager. Mut. Automobile Ass’n., to the
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 24, 1920) (on file with authors).
109. APIB 1920, supra note 93, at 1.
110. Memorandum from William Burns, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Investigation, to the
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 3, 1921) (on file with authors); see also APIB 1920,
supra note 93, at 1 (“arrangements were made for an intensified drive by the Federal Special
Agents against the automobile thief.”).
111. The APIB’s activities on auto theft cases offers an example of how associations
during this period of “New Federalism,” as political scientist Kimberley Johnson calls it,
“bridged the divide between bureaucrats and interest groups.” KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON,
GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE 6 (1966).
112. APIB 1920, supra note 93, at 3.
113. Memorandum from William Burns to the Att’y Gen., supra note 110, at 2.
114. Leonard D. Savitz, Automobile Theft, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 132, 132
(1959) (citing Impson v. State, 47 Ariz. 573 (1930)). About 17.5 percent of those convicted
under the Dyer Act were eighteen or under and charged with joyriding. Representative Dyer
was so troubled when he learned of “mere cases of joy-rides by young men” that he introduced
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easier to prove than accompanying state crimes like robbery, and local officials
were more than happy to pass along any case involving a car that crossed a state
border.115
But the Dyer Act’s main value lay in coordinating law enforcement efforts
among jurisdictions, when police in one locality apprehended someone with a
car stolen from another locality, or when police in a theft victim’s state needed
help from the recovering state. As Hoover explained, even simple Dyer Act investigations generally required “interstate inquiries, which the Bureau makes
through its various field offices.”116 He continued:
The state authorities would be extremely handicapped … by lack of investigative authority extending from one locality to another, by lack of
funds requisite to subpoena witnesses from one locality to another, by
the necessity of resorting to a complicated system of removal hearings,
extradition writs and other legal necessities which it would be necessary to invoke and by what I feel sure would be a very positive disinclination on the part of various local authorities to incur the expense
and trouble to properly enforce the Act where local individuals or individuals of local prominence were not involved.117
Given the challenges that Hoover described, the Bureau’s role in Dyer Act
cases often amounted to “packaging” information across jurisdictions and then
“gifting” the cases back to local authorities to prosecute. Hoover noted in 1929
that “in some instances we find that prosecution is instituted in State Courts under local Statutes, particularly where the case holds some local interest or where
important witnesses are readily available without the State incurring a large expenditure.”118 Regardless of whether the prosecution was ultimately brought in
state or federal court, the Bureau’s involvement in auto theft cases presented a
solution to local police departments’ coordination problem. Federal facilitation
via the Dyer Act substituted for interstate information sharing and clunky extradition procedures.119

a bill in 1930 to repeal his namesake law. Buel W. Patch, Proposed Expansions of Federal
Police Activity, 1 EDIT. RSCH. REPORTS 231, 231 (1932); Memorandum from Attorney General
to All United States Attorneys (Jan. 10, 1933) (on file with authors).
115. See, e.g., Kansas Bandit Slain, ST. JOSEPH NEW-PRESS, July 20, 1931,
https://perma.cc/T4H5-U64F.
116. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of Investigation, to Oscar R.
Luhring, Ass’t. Att’y. Gen. of the Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 18, 1929) (on
file with authors).
117. Id.
118. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. to Oscar R. Luhring, Ass’t. Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 29, 1930) (on file with authors).
119. See John H. Jackson, What’s Happening to the Car Stealing Racket?, 7 J. AM.
INSUR. 7, 7 (1930) (“Theoretically, the apprehension of automobile thieves is a state matter,
but by making the transportation of a stolen car over a state line a federal crime, and thereby
putting the matter in the hands of federal officials, the necessity of co-operation between local
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In 1935, a columnist close to Hoover described this “service” aspect of the
Dyer Act in the following way:
Before the passage of this act, the run of bureau cases was tied tightly
to the business of the Federal Government: there was little opportunity
to be of assistance to State and local law-enforcement agencies. The
new law widened tremendously the scope of activities. True, if a man
robbed a bank, that was not the bureau’s business since the robbery of
even a national bank [] was not a Federal crime until less than two
years ago. But if that robber stole a car during that holdup and crossed
a State line, he then became a fugitive from Federal justice. … A Federal chase for a violator of the national vehicle theft act has often led to
the solution of a local mystery. A motivating crime is found, the theft
of the car being the act of the moment, impelled by something quite
different—usually the desire to escape from some other law violation.
The Federal agency therefore frequently becomes an assisting agency
to the enforcement bodies of the Nation, later withdrawing from the
case if the State charge is the more serious.120
In this account, the Bureau applied the new federal criminal laws in order to
help, not to encroach, local domains. Even diligent police chiefs sometimes
found themselves relying on the feds given the coordination challenges. At an
IACP conference in 1927, Chief J. W. Higgins of Buffalo, New York, complained that “other cities are not co-operating with us to the extent we co-operate
with them.”121 Fortunately, the Bureau could step in to help.
In time, local protocols instructing officers to reach out to the feds whenever
they recovered an out-of-state stolen car became common.122 When, in 1927, a
police and of extraditing the criminal who has been arrested in a foreign state has been eliminated.”).
120. Courtney Ryley Cooper, 10,000 Public Enemies: Chapter VI. Chief of the ManHunters, WASH. POST, July 20, 1935, at 24. See POWERS, supra note 91, at 196-200 for a
discussion of Cooper’s relationship with Hoover.
121. J. W. Higgins, The Theft and Recovery of Automobiles, 34 PROCS. ANNUAL
CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 83, 85 (1927).
122. State Joins U.S. Dep’t. in Auto Theft Cases, HARTFORD COURANT, July 28, 1921
(reporting that state motor vehicle commissioner committed to notify the federal bureau of
investigation “whenever an arrest is made in Connecticut for the theft of a motor vehicle in
another state and federal agent will be assigned to the case.”).
Not all states passed the buck. In 1926, explaining why no Dyer Act prisoners came from
certain states, the superintendent of prisons noted, “That means only this, gentlemen, not that
there are no motor vehicles being stolen, but that the State of Massachusetts, for instance, is
rigidly enforcing its local law, and, therefore, we get no prisoners under the national motor
vehicle theft law.” Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1927: Hearing Before Subcomm. of H. Comm. On Appropriations, 69th Cong. 287 (1926) (testimony of Luther C. White,
superintendent of prisons). Other states trumpeted their own efforts. A 1929 magazine article
commented, “One reason why Milwaukee recovers ninety-five per cent of all its stolen automobiles is because it maintains exhaustive records of such stolen property in the Identification
Bureau as well as in the traffic department.” Ruel McDaniel, Wisconsin Gets Her Men, NORTH
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Martinsburg, West Virginia, constable found an abandoned car with Florida
plates, he scribbled a note to the Justice Department,123 which got passed to Hoover, who, in turn, assured the assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division
that the matter would receive the Bureau’s full attention.124 The constable appears to have found that car by himself, but Justice Department correspondence
indicates that local recoveries were often spearheaded by insurance company
representatives accompanied by local police, who then passed the case on to the
feds.125 In fact, just about all Dyer Act cases came from local officials. And there
were many; according to one insurance agent, out of the 10,505,660 cars in the
country in 1921, 60,145 had been stolen, and 43,664 had been recovered.126 Far
from intruding on local matters, Dyer Act cases amounted to the federal collection and packaging of information for the benefit of all concerned. Significantly,
it was the feds, not the states, that were able to provide this service, and it was
the feds, not the states, to whom local police departments were obliged.
2. What the Bureau got in return
Auto theft cases made up a significant portion of the Bureau’s docket. For
example, in 1922, Dyer Act prosecutions comprised 43.74 percent of the Bureau’s total convictions (see Table 1). That year, Chief Burns testified at a House
appropriations hearing that the increasing number of Dyer Act cases reflected “a
marked tendency on the part of State authorities to shift [] responsibility on[to]
Federal authorities.”127 The next Bureau chief, J. Edgar Hoover, embraced the
tendency even more enthusiastically. After Burns’ resignation in 1924, the
APIB’s annual report noted that it “received excellent co-operation from Mr.
AMER. REV. 744, 746 (June 1929).
123. Letter from Thomas Hardy, Constable, Martinsburg, W. Va., to the Dep’t of Justice
(May 23, 1927) (on file with authors).
124. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of Investigation, to Oscar R.
Luhring, Ass’t Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice (May 31, 1927) (on file
with authors); Letter from Oscar R. Luhring, Ass’t Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Div. of the
Dep’t of Justice, to Thomas Hardy, Constable, Martinsburg, W. Va. (June 2, 1927) (on file
with authors); Letter to the Att’y Gen, from Thomas Hardy, Constable, Martinsburg, W. Va.
(June 3, 1927) (on file with authors); Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of
Investigation, to Oscar R. Luhring, Ass’t Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice (June 10, 1927) (on file with authors); Letter from Oscar R. Luhring, Ass’t Att’y Gen. of
the Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice, to Thomas Hardy, Constable, Martinsburg, W. Va.
(June 14, 1927) (on file with authors).
125. Letter from William A. De Groot, U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. Of N.Y., to Att’y Gen. (Oct.
14, 1926) (on file with authors).
126. Letter from E. L. Rickards to John Crim, Ass’t. Att’y Gen. (May 11, 1922), (on file
with authors).
127. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1923: Hearing Before Subcomm. of
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 67th Cong. 128 (1922) (testimony of Director Burns); see also
id. at 262 (quoting Ass’t. Att’y. Gen. Holland’s statement that, “as Federal laws are extended,
so that offenses which were formerly punishable by the States are punishable under Federal
law, it is very noticeable that State officials sidestep their responsibility and put such responsibility on the Federal Government.”).
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Wm. J. Burns, Former Director, but the present Director, Mr. J. E. Hoover, is
more intensely interested in the enforcement of the National Motor Vehicle Theft
Act and fully realizes the effect of automobile thievery on general crime conditions.”128 By 1929, the 2,123 Dyer Act convictions constituted more than half of
the 3,950 convictions the Bureau had “secured” (another 457 were under the
Mann Act).129 After reading the Bureau’s annual report for 1937-1938, the celebrated newspaperman Damon Runyon remarked, “What interests us as much as
anything else is the way those G-fellows go after automobile thieves.”130
Table 1. Breakdown of Total Bureau Convictions.131

128. AMERICAN PROTECTIVE AND INFO. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT 1923-1924, at 2

(1924).
129. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 69 (1929).
130. Damon Runyon, The Brighter Side, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1939, at 19.
131. Data was taken from Attorney General Annual Reports 1921–1940. For years before 1928, the Bureau reported convictions by sentence amounts imposed rather than numbers
convicted. Conviction numbers for years 1921–1927 were therefore taken from statements in
appropriation bills or by calculating a sentences imposed-to-conviction ratio from future years.
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Table 2. Bureau Appropriations Compared to Percentage of Dyer and Mann
Act Convictions.132

It wasn’t that the Bureau lacked other matters crying out for its investigative attention. As David Grann recounts in Killers of the Flower Moon, in the
spring of 1923, when the Osage Tribal Council appealed to the Justice Department to investigate a growing spate of murders targeting its members, Chief
Burns dispatched agents to pursue desultory inquiries largely at the tribe’s expense.133 Hoover, on becoming director, carried on the assignment, but with an
inadequacy that Grann makes clear in sad detail. Not only was the investigation
extremely complex and challenging, made no easier by local authorities who
were complicit in the Osage murders, but it also risked alienating those very authorities—precisely the opposite of the Dyer Act cases that forged collaborative
relationships.
Hoover collaborated on auto theft cases not simply because locals sought
federal help. He also understood the benefit to the Bureau. Its work on Dyer
Act cases justified the agency’s existence. Testifying at a House appropriations
hearing in 1926, Hoover mentioned having “just received” an annual report
from the Theft Committee of the National Automobile Underwriters Conference, which highlighted how the most recent fine and recovery data “prove
conclusively that the Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, is enforcing the national motor vehicle theft act and your committee firmly believes that
this arm of the Government is serving the public 100 per cent.”134 Hoover was
132. For conviction numbers, see supra note 131. Appropriation amounts were taken
from Attorney General Annual Reports 1921–1940.
133. DAVID GRANN, KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON: THE OSAGE MURDERS AND THE
BIRTH OF THE FBI 110-11 (2017).
134. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1927: Hearing Before Subcomm. of
H. Comm. On Appropriations, 69th Cong. 108 (1926) (statement of J.E. Hoover, Director,
Bureau of Investigation). See also Dyer Law Nips 272 Prisoners in a Year, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, January 30, 1921 (noting federal achievements in first year of Dyer Act touted in report
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not shy about deploying this broad-based industry support—and the steady
stream of statistics—during congressional appropriations hearings. Nor was he
even original. Attorney General Daugherty in 1922 had touted both “the value
of the stolen motor vehicles recovered by the Bureau of Investigation” and the
“[e]xcellent cooperation” between DOJ agents, “peace officers throughout the
United States,” and “the insurance companies writing auto theft insurance.”135
Moreover, in appreciation for the Bureau’s assistance in auto theft cases,
local departments often reciprocated when the Bureau needed their help. An assistant director noted in 1930 that “the bureau’s representatives in various sections of the country are dependent in very many instances upon the good will of
sheriffs’ offices and other law-enforcement officials for cooperative support in
the conduct of investigations.”136 Hoover further explained to Congress how the
Bureau’s close relationships with local police saved money; instead of sending
an agent from Dallas all the way to the Panhandle to check out a subject as part
of a routine investigation, an agent could simply wire the police chief or sheriff
who would do it for the Bureau “without any cost to us.”137 It was thus through
the Bureau’s service to commercial interests and local law enforcement that the
fledgling agency was able to expand its capacity beyond its small size and limited funds.138
Local assistance was crucial to the Bureau’s ability to pursue its own investigations and to demonstrate its effectiveness to a public that was increasingly
calling for federal action in cases involving jurisdiction-crossing gangsters,
bank robbers, and kidnappers.139 Even President Herbert Hoover, stalwart defender of local rule, could not ignore these demands. In 1930, he announced
that the federal government would provide reinforcements in “an intensified cooperative drive against racketeering in Chicago and elsewhere.”140 This an-

submitted to the directors of the National Automobile Dealers’ Association in Chicago).
135. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 70-71 (1922).
The relationship between Bureau officials, insurance companies, and congressional overseers soon looked a lot like the “iron triangles” that would develop in other regulatory spaces
that supported agencies and shaped their work. Francis E. Rourke, American Bureaucracy in
a Changing Political System, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 111, 118 (1991).
136. Letter from H. Nathan, Asst. Dir., Bureau of Investigation, to Dir., Bureau of Prisons (August 9, 1930), quoted in Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1932: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. of H. Comm. On Appropriations, 71st Cong. 179-180 (1930) (statement of Sanford Bates, Director, Bureau of Prisons).
137. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1934: Hearing Before Subcomm. of
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 72nd Cong. 92 (1932).
138. In 1929, the Bureau employed 136 people at headquarters (not including the Identification Division) and had a field force (scattered in 30 field offices) of 460, of which 285
were agents and 73 accountants. Albert Langeluttig, Federal Police, 146 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 42, 52 (1929).
139. Louis M. Howe, Uncle Sam Starts after Crime, SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 29,
1933; see also Kathleen Frydl, Kidnapping and State Development in the United States, 20
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 18, 24 (2006).
140. Topics of the Day: The Nation Aroused to Smash the Racketeer, LITERARY DIGEST,
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nouncement prompted newspapers to report that “the nation wars on racketeering;” indeed, it was “more than a war, it is a revolution … against gangster and
hoodlum rule.”141 Anxieties about crime reached fever pitch in 1932, when
Charles Lindbergh’s twenty-month-old son was kidnapped from his own
home.142 When the baby’s body was found two months after the kidnapping,
the public demanded a national response.143 Congress promptly considered a
bill to make the transportation of kidnapped persons across state lines a federal
offense.144
Despite the federal government’s efforts, banner headlines continued in
1933 during Roosevelt’s first year in office. In the June “Kansas City massacre,” a group of notorious gangsters ambushed law enforcement officers and
left an agent and three police officers dead during an attempt to free one of
their own in federal custody.145 In July, “Machine Gun” Kelly kidnapped an oil
tycoon for ransom.146 Later that year, John Dillinger and his crew killed the
Lima, Ohio, sheriff during a jailbreak, launching a nationwide manhunt for the
outlaw.147 Responding to this breakdown in law and order, Roosevelt’s attorney
general, Homer Cummings, rolled out a “twelve point plan for crime prevention” as part of the new administration’s “war on crime.”148
Although the Roosevelt administration, unlike its predecessor, envisioned a
robust national state to tackle the problems of modern society,149 Congress did
not match the Bureau’s growing jurisdiction with commensurate appropriations. With insufficient agents in the field, the Bureau’s collaborative relationships with local departments, cultivated through its “service” cases under the
Dyer Act, came in handy. Not only did local assistance extend the Bureau’s
reach, it also allowed the Bureau to project an outsized image of its capacity,
offering reassurance to a public that was increasingly expecting the feds to fight
crime.

Dec. 6, 1930.
141. Id.
142. See Frydl, supra note 139.
143. See R. L. Duffus, Kidnapping: A Rising Menace to the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1932, XX1; Patch, supra note 114.
144. See Patch, supra note 114, at 232-33.
145. CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME 2 (1958); see generally ROBERT UNGER, THE
UNION STATION MASSACRE: THE ORIGINAL SIN OF J. EDGAR HOOVER’S FBI (1997) (finding
massive holes in the standard FBI account of the ambush and arguing that the agent was likely
killed by friendly fire).
146. Frydl, supra note 139, at 23-24.
147. Memorandum from S.F. Cowley to J.E. Hoover, Dir., Bureau of Investigation. (Oct.
24, 1933) (on file with authors) (discussing the murder of Sheriff Jesse Barber by the Dillinger
Gang); see also POTTER, supra note 145, at 143-44.
148. Attorney General Cummings Outlines Crime Prevention Program Over CBS,
COLUMBIA BROAD. SYS., Apr. 19, 1934, at 2 [hereinafter Attorney General Outlines].
149. See Frydl, supra note 139, at 16 (“It is worth noting the coterminous advance of the
social welfare state with the security state; the threat of economic peril alongside perceived or
real threats to basic security provided a shared rhetorical context that legitimized and extended
the case for federal power in general.”).
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The cooperative nature of Dyer Act cases also neutralized any potential
disruption to the Bureau’s relationship with locals when it swooped in to take
over higher profile cases.150 The Bureau pursued some noted Bad Guys and, to
the extent possible, maintained control over those cases, both to ensure success
and to credibly claim credit. To the extent possible is a critical caveat, for the
Bureau could make its cases only with considerable cooperation from the same
local authorities it wanted in the shadows. The Bureau’s assiduous work on
auto theft cases would more than offset these informational and resource “withdrawals” from its local counterparts.151
The pursuit of the infamous gangster John Dillinger, who had committed
multiple Dyer Act violations (a fact always noted in the Bureau’s case files), illustrates the fine line that Hoover had to walk between showcasing the Bureau’s effectiveness and appeasing locals. When Tucson, Arizona, police apprehended Dillinger in January 1934, Hoover publicly praised the work of the city
and county peace offices.152 But in private, he allowed others to give credit to
the Bureau. When the president of a “scientific protection firm” congratulated
Hoover on the success of “your men” and voiced his “suspicion” that Hoover
had directed “the credit” to the local police, Hoover was careful not to correct
the writer’s misimpression.153 The writer added, “I’m sure this will pay you
many times in securing the co-operation of the local police departments with
your men.” Hoover agreed that “this practice on the part of newspapers will aid
materially in securing the cooperation of the local and Federal authorities.”154
Maintaining tight Bureau control over the Dillinger manhunt while not aggrieving state and local police could be challenging. IACP’s president quietly

150. ROBERT ALVIN WATERS & ZACK C. WATERS, THE KIDNAPPING AND MURDER OF
LITTLE SKEEGIE CASH: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND FLORIDA’S LINDBERGH CASE 16 (2014) (noting
that the Bureau “alienat[ed] many local cops by always taking full credit for any successful
case and blaming local police for any failures.”).
151. Also offset were the Bureau’s occasional investigatory forays into vice and corruption that implicated local police and raised the hackles of their congressional protectors, and,
after 1940, into civil rights violations committed by police officers. See Department of Justice
Appropriation Bill for 1941: Hearings on H.R. 8319 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm on
Appropriations, 76th Cong. 167-68 (1940) (Statement of Dir. Hoover. explaining to a somewhat hostile Florida Representative Millard Caldwell (soon to be governor) that the Bureau
was investigating actual federal crimes when it scrutinized Miami Beach conditions and found
that certain police agencies “were not interested or sincere in the enforcement of law.”); Elliff,
supra note 58, at 66-67, 142 (describing Hoover cautioning against a civil rights inquiry into
a police brutality case); POWERS, supra note 91, at 327 (describing Hoover cautioning agents
not to comment unfavorably on their civil rights investigations of police); COOK, supra note
81, at 23 (noting efforts within the Bureau in the 1960s to “go easy on local police because of
the need for their cooperation in other Bureau matters.”).
152. J. Edgar Hoover Lauds Work of Police, TUCSON DAILY CITIZEN, Jan. 26, 1934 (on
file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 3, Serial No. 62-29777-74).
153. Letter from Pres., Fed. Lab’ys, to J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of Investigation
(Jan. 26, 1934) (on file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 3, Serial No. 62-2977765).
154. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of Investigation, to John Young, Pres.,
Fed. Lab’ys (Feb. 2, 1934) (on file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 3, Serial No.
62-29777-65).
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chided Hoover’s media-hogging, noting press reports of Hoover’s “constant
and devoted search for Dillinger.”155 “While your faithful agents are making
every effort to apprehend this man,” he allowed, “we likewise are making a
similar effort,” he pointed out. He ended the letter by guaranteeing that the
“ENTIRE FORCES” of the IACP “are at YOUR disposal.”156 For its part, the
Bureau took pains to shoot down a press report “to the effect that this Division
has not cooperated with [local] law enforcement officials” because it had
“caused considerable embarrassment particularly because it is not true . . . and
secondarily because it has caused collaborators of the Division to feel offended
and hurt.”157
After Dillinger escaped from the Crown Point County Jail in Indiana with
help from corrupt local officials in March and a failed attempt to capture him in
April, Hoover demanded that “Public Enemy #1” be given priority over all
other matters.158 When Special Agent Melvin Purvis asked headquarters
whether “he should solicit the assistance of local law enforcement” when conducting raids in the case, Hoover sent instructions that “such raids should be
conducted by Division Agents exclusively whenever possible,” with outreach
to locals only if “absolutely necessary.”159 All the while, managing intergovernmental relations remained critical to the effort. When Indiana Governor McNutt
told a Bureau official that his “chief desire is to have a member of the State Police present when Dillinger was captured,” the official assured him that the Bureau would call “whenever possible.” But the official took care to substitute the
state director of public safety, whom the Bureau knew and trusted, for the highprofile state police captain whom the governor had suggested.160 Ultimately, it
was another Indiana force, the East Chicago police, that provided the critical information. They had an informant in contact with Dillinger, and two officers

155. Letter from Chas. A. Wheeler, Pres., IACP, to J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Bureau of
Investigation (Apr. 6, 1934) (on file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 9, Serial No.
62-29777-418).
156. Id.
157. Memorandum from S.P. Cowley for Dir. John Edgar Hoover (Apr. 26, 1934) (on
file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 18, Serial No. 62-29777-926).
158. Telegrams from J. Edgar Hoover, to New York and Chicago offices (Apr. 30, 1934)
(on file with vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 19, Serial No. 62-29777-985-87); see also
POTTER, supra note 145, at 145 (on local corruption); see generally BRYAN BURROUGH, PUBLIC
ENEMIES 292-322 (2004).
159. Memorandum for the Director, from S.P. Cowley (Mar. 7, 1934) (on file with
vault.fbi, John Dillinger Gang, Section 4, Serial No. 62-29777-128).
160. See Memorandum from Office of Dir. (May 4, 1934) (on file with vault.fbi, John
Dillinger Gang, Section 22, Serial No. 62-29777-1176); see also BURROUGH, supra note 158,
at 94-97 (on Matt Leach); COOK, supra note 81, at 181 (on how Captain Leach “found himself
completely frozen out” of a pursuit in which the Bureau’s refusal to coordinate with local
police nearly led to a shootout between them).
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were eager to help if they could “work with” the Bureau.161 Dillinger was ambushed at the Biograph Theater days later.162 As this turn of events illustrates,
while the Bureau could handle its relationships with state police agencies—a
not too demanding task, for state police were rarely in the serious crime control
business to begin with163 and, when involved, were more like rivals—dependence on local police was virtually non-negotiable. Even with thirty-eight agents
assigned full-time,164 the Bureau would not have been able to track Dillinger
without considerable assistance from local police.
This reliance on locals explains why the Bureau did not pause its work on
Dyer Act cases even during wartime; it needed to keep cultivating the exchange
of mutual benefit. It also needed to appease Congress, and Hoover continued to
feature Dyer Act recovery figures as justification for the Bureau’s appropriations. After the war, the Bureau ramped up its internal security operations and
belatedly began to focus on organized crime and civil rights violations.165 Even
amid these forays, however, Dyer Act cases continued to provide a ground
bass, a steady source of easily obtained statistics justifying appropriations for
legislators skeptical of the Bureau’s other work.166 Indeed, as the war ended,
Hoover was quick to note that auto thefts were starting to spike.167 In 1946,
when Hoover asked for an additional 3,000 agents, he noted that each agent
was currently handling an average of 19.09 cases and reported that Dyer Act
cases (among others) were bound to increase.168 These ritual supplications before Congress, with Bureau officials citing its service to local departments, continued until the late 1960s.169
161. Potter sees this as part of a pattern during this period, with the Bureau “competing
with local police to get information first and providing local officers with incentives to circumvent their own commanders and report directly to federal agents.” POTTER, supra note
145, at 179-80.
162. BURROUGH, supra note 158, at 388-416, recounts the story in wonderful detail; see
also Dillinger Slain in Chicago; Shot Dead by Federal Men in Front of Movie Theatre, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 1934, at 1.
163. Paul Musgrave has found that, between 1905 and 1941, “[h]omicide rates are, if
anything, a negative predictor of propensity to adopt a statewide policing agency.” Musgrave,
supra note 35, at 15.
164. BURROUGH, supra note 158, at 347.
165. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 345-63 (1965).
166. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations for 1955: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 83rd Cong. 167-68 (1953)
(testifying at a 1953 appropriations hearing, Hoover noted, “[d]uring the past year 13,886 stolen automobiles were recovered in cases investigated by the Bureau, an all-time high,” and
called auto theft “one of the most aggravated criminal problems we are faced with in this
country.”).
167. Department of Justice Appropriations Bill for 1947: Hearings before the Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 79th Cong. 155, 167 (1946) (testimony of J. Edgar Hoover) (noting uptick in auto thefts after the war: 27% more automobile thefts between November 1944 and November 1945; 74% increase in auto theft violations from October 1940 to
January 1946; 62% of car thefts committed by persons under age 21).
168. Id. at 161.
169. Bureau officials continued to cite Dyer Act statistics during appropriations hearings
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B. The National Identification and Information Division
Even as Bureau agents spent an outsized proportion of their time on Dyer
Act cases, the agency became even more directly involved in the collection of
criminal information through its management of identification data and crime
statistics, the latter ultimately becoming the Uniform Crime Reporting system
used today. This not only gave the Bureau another opportunity to serve local
departments, but it also put the agency at the forefront of a larger effort to
gather information about crime and criminals (and many non-criminals, too).170
The power that came with control over information began not with any
grand schemes of J. Edgar Hoover but with local police departments. In 1921,
twenty years after it unsuccessfully proposed “a National Bureau of Criminal
Identification” to Congress, the IACP tried again, this time with the Bureau’s
assistance. After meeting with IACP representatives, Chief William Burns announced his intention to establish a national fingerprint registry.171 Two years
later, the IACP unanimously adopted resolutions to transfer its records, all
138,000 of them, to the DOJ before Congress had even authorized the federal
agency to collect them.172 Burns, also impatient with congressional inaction,
unilaterally ordered all records from the federal prison in Leavenworth to be
transferred to Washington.173 FBI critic Max Lowenthal would later claim that
the Bureau had taken over the IACP and Leavenworth fingerprint registries to
“eliminate competition,” but the Bureau’s “customers” were fully complicit.174
These moves also forced Congress’s hand, resulting in hearings on the matter
the following year.
for decades, even when others did most of the legwork in bringing auto theft cases. See
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN, THE BUREAU: MY THIRTY YEARS IN HOOVER’S FBI 118 (1970) (“What
the senators never knew was that most (if not all) of the real work involved in investigating
the kinds of crimes that made for Hoover’s blockbuster statistics, juvenile car theft and the
like, was done by the local police, not the FBI.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS:
MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 98 (1978) (noting how agents “would call up local
police departments in search of recovered cars, which, if it could be shown they had come
from out of state were listed as ‘FBI recoveries’”); Tom Wicker, What Have They Done Since
They Shot Dillinger?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1969, at SM19 (observing that even if it was local
police, not FBI agents, that chased down stolen cars that crossed state lines, the Bureau still
“[took] the recovered automobiles, add[ed] their value to its statistics, prosecute[d] the thief if
possible, and count[ed] him as another arrest and conviction”); Louis M. Kohlmeier, Hoover
Loses Immunity to Criticism Despite “Law-and-Order” Mood, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1968, at
1 (noting that “[s]ome crime experts question the significance” of Hoover’s oft-touted statistics about recoveries and fugitives located since “[l]ocal police often help capture fugitives
and recover cars”).
170. The Bureau’s leadership in this endeavor gave it a central role in a larger “legibility”
process—to use James Scott’s term about a state’s commitment to “map” its terrain and people—that enhanced its nationwide status and was foundational to the state-building project
during this period. JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2-3 (1998).
171. LOWENTHAL, supra note 44, at 370.
172. To Create a National Police Bureau, To Create a Bureau of Criminal Identification: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 25, 27 (1924).
173. LOWENTHAL, supra note 44, at 372-73.
174. Id. at 370.
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Concerns about centralized policing continued to loom large during the
1924 hearings. A national criminal identification database seemed too similar
to the registration of citizens maintained by centralized states in Europe.175 Several members of Congress asked whether the project would lead to a national
police force and how it would affect the federal-state relationship on law enforcement, particularly at a time when National Prohibition was straining that
relationship. House members also considered under what authority the federal
government could “compel the chiefs of police commissioners to furnish this
information to [a federal] official.”176 It seemed necessary, according to one
representative, to connect the “constitutional grant of power” to “the purpose of
obtaining information” for an existing federal department fulfilling its duties
under federal laws.177 This was where the passage of time and intervening
events made a difference. In 1901, when the IACP first proposed the bill, the
Mann Act was nearly a decade away.178 By 1924, when Congress reconsidered
the bill, the federal government had not only the Mann Act but also the Volstead Act and the Dyer Act. Chief Burns testified that in the year since the
IACP handed over its information bureau to the DOJ, it was already proving to
be effective in solving federal crimes, such as “stealing automobiles, the Mann
Act, [and] impersonations.”179 Although the federal government’s own needs
helped to persuade a wary Congress, the support of local police chiefs who had
sought this measure for decades was just as critical. In July 1924, Congress finally established the National Identification Division and housed it in the Bureau of Investigation.180
After congressional authorization, mobilizing local enforcers who had
sway with Congress remained an important part of the Bureau’s appropriations
strategy. The IACP continued to remind its members to “enlighten Senators and
Representatives in Congress from their respective districts regarding the success and value of the Division of Information and Identification, that they may
readily comprehend its worth and assist in its upbuilding.”181 Hoover himself
encouraged the locals to take pride and ownership over the criminal registry
system, telling IACP members at its 1925 convention that the “Division of
175. Id. at 375-76 (noting that concern was first raised in 1908-09). Tocqueville once
contrasted the lack of surveillance systems in the United States with France’s system of internal passports and residential registrations, as well as a centralized reporting system of criminal
convictions. Sankar, supra note 13, at 118-119 (citing TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 61 (New York, 1951)).
176. To Create a National Police Bureau, To Create a Bureau of Criminal Identification: Hearing on H.R. 8580 and H.R. 8409 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
7 (1924) (testimony of Richard E. Enright).
177. Id.
178. In 1900, when the IACP president approached the attorney general for his support
for a national criminal identification bureau, the DOJ head responded that he did not believe
that such a project was “so closely connected with this department as to call for my official
support or particular recommendation.” Sankar, supra note 13, at 258 (quoting Letter from
John W. Griggs, Att’y Gen., to Richard Sylvester, Pres., IACP (Dec. 6, 1900)).
179. Id. at 78.
180. 1925 Proceeding, supra note 10, at 50.
181. Id. at 65.
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Identification is your child.”182 Congressional support for federal law enforcement projects would come and go, but legislators’ support for the police departments primarily responsible for protecting their constituents was an enduring
feature of the political landscape.
The mutuality of benefits was precisely why the Identification Division
proved so successful.183 Just two years after Congress authorized it, Hoover announced that he could “now say that we have achieved a practically [sic] unanimity of support for the National Division of Identification of all the Chiefs of
Police of all the cities in the United States and Canada of large size.”184 He was
particularly pleased to report that even New York and Chicago—the two cities
that had the most fractious relationship with federal authorities because of National Prohibition—had come around and “developed a close relationship of
mutual interest and cooperation” with the Bureau.185 Moving forward, the goal
was now “to secur[e] every possible extension of the scope, influence and value
of the National Division of Identification” by entering “into continued relations
with the sheriffs of every county, in each state of the country.”186 Managing the
Identification Division extended the scope, influence and value of the Bureau
as well. Police departments grateful for its services returned the favor by gathering information for the Bureau when needed. As one pundit put it, “When the
local officials are puzzled the national bureau clears up the doubt. When Uncle
Sam is puzzled, he can call on any of the local officials for information.”187 As
historian Richard Powers put it, the collaboration placed Hoover “at the head of
a law enforcement community drawn into a cooperative network.”188
The Bureau soon expanded the sorts of data it was collecting beyond criminal identification. When IACP leaders testified before Congress in 1924, they
suggested that the Identification Division might also keep track of “daily lists
of stolen automobiles, names, numbers, and data that might lead to recovery,”
and more generally, “reports of crimes,” “reports of threatened or contemplated
depredations by enemies of State,” and “names and descriptions of outlaw organizations and of persons belonging to bomb gangs.”189 Congress agreed, and
legislators began studying the feasibility of receiving “crime statistics and other

182. 1925 Proceeding, supra note 10, at 50.
183. The Bureau’s data collection duties were sometimes in tension with its high-profile

police work. See Spenser D. Parrett, How Effective Is a Police Department?, 199 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 158 (1938) (noting: “The unfortunate animosity between the
Bureau of Investigation and many local police departments, based upon the relatively favorable publicity obtained by the Bureau in competition with local officers for public approbation,
complicates the capacity of the Bureau ‘trouble shooters’ to obtain local cooperation” in collecting UCR statistics).
184. 1926 Proceeding, supra note 10, at 111.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 58.
188. POWERS, supra note 91, at 155.
189. To Create a National Police Bureau, To Create a Bureau of Criminal Identification: Hearing on H.R. 8580 and H.R. 8409 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
69 (1924) (testimony of Major Sylvester).
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subjects germane to the division under the law, all to be afforded enforcing offices as information for the prevention, suppression and detection of crime.”190
In fact, by the 1920s, calls for better and more statistical data on all things
crime related were heard from a diverse array of experts, from law enforcement
to census wonks, from lawyers to social scientists.191 The Wickersham Commission, in its extensive survey of what went wrong with the Prohibition experiment, also touted the importance of data, noting “[s]tatistics are needed to tell
us, or at least to help us tell us, what we have to do now, how we are doing it,
and how far what we are doing responds to what we have to do.”192 The commissioners deplored that “no such data can be had for the country as a whole”
and proposed that data collection and analysis be centralized under one federal
agency.193
The Commission was adamant that the Bureau ought not to be selected for
the task, lest it marshal criminal statistics to justify its expanding authority. “It
takes but little experience,” the Wickersham Report explained, “to convince
that a serious abuse exists in compiling [criminal statistics] as a basis for requesting appropriations or for justifying the existence of or urging expanded
powers and equipment for the agency in question rather than for the purposes
which criminal statistics are designed to further.”194 By the time the Wickersham Commission issued its report in 1931, however, Congress had already selected the Bureau on the recommendation of the IACP.195 In 1928, the association had suggested that “the Identification Division of the Department of
Justice might be a very logical place in which to assemble statistics on crime”
because all fingerprints were already going to the Bureau.196 It also made sense
because the project required the voluntary participation of local police, which
had the criminal information that would furnish the statistics in the first place,
and the Bureau had already nurtured collaborative relationships with them.
In addition to Dyer Act prosecutions and the Identification and Information
Division, the Bureau further fostered its relationship with locals through the
FBI Laboratory, which was set up in 1932 and provided forensic assistance to
departments throughout the country.197 In 1935, the Bureau also established the

190. See 1926 Proceeding, supra note 10, at 64.
191. See Louis N. Robinson, History of Criminal Statistics, 24 AM. INST. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 125 (1933); Beverly Gage, Counting Crime: J. Edgar Hoover, the Wickersham
Commission, and the Problem of Criminal Statistics, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2013);
Lawrence Rosen, The Creation of the Uniform Crime Report: The Role of Social Science, 19
SOC. SCI. HIST. 215, 221 (1995).
192. U.S. WICKERSHAM COMM’N REP., REPORT ON CRIMINAL STATISTICS 3 (1931).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 5-6. See also Gage, supra note 191, at 1117.
195. H.R. 977, 71st Cong. (1930) (enacted); see also BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS VOL. 1, at 1 (Aug. 1930).
196. Appropriations, Department of Justice, 1928: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 69th Cong. 58 (1926) (testimony of J. Edgar Hoover).
197. Hoover would later boast:
all a law enforcement agency need do is invest in the price of a postage stamp, and
it has available the entire resources, talents and experience of the FBI Laboratory.
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National Academy to train police officers and, in the process, create a cadre of
willing collaborators in Bureau operations. During his 1937 appropriations testimony, Hoover noted that the Academy “remove[d] the argument for the establishment of a national police force” because it “bridge[d] over that gap between
local and Federal law-enforcement officers” by “eliminat[ing] the jealousies
that sometimes exist and help[ing] to do away with friction which may develop.”198 By 1940, he would proclaim the Academy the “West Point of Law
Enforcement” and its graduates a “‘reserve force’ that could ‘be mustered into
the service of the FBI.’”199
To make sure that the American public, and not just the local police, understood the Bureau’s role, Hoover allowed (or persuaded) Universal Pictures to
shoot a short documentary about the FBI, titled You Can’t Get Away With It,
showcasing the agency’s work.200 Released in 1936, the film explained how violations of the Dyer Act “put the G-men” on the trail of notorious criminals. It
recorded the Identification Division’s cache of fingerprints and system of
matching them to suspects, as well as the Crime Lab where experts analyzed
fingerprints, handwriting, and bullet patterns; created moulage impressions to
compare teeth marks, footprints, and other body parts; and used newfangled
scientific tools so that “there was no crime that cannot be solved.” The documentary even showed agents practicing their marksmanship at the Academy.
You Can’t Get Away With It closed with Hoover looking straight into the camera, declaring that the FBI “belongs to you.” The film captures both strands of
the Bureau’s strategy: an avowal of service, deeply rooted in its relationships
with state and local authorities, and a barely implicit declaration of its centrality
to crime-fighting throughout the nation.
III. COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS
The Bureau’s work on Dyer Act cases, its administration of the National
Identification and Information Division, and its operation of the Crime Lab and
A small sheriff’s office or police department – not financially able to maintain a
criminal laboratory–has at its disposal the latest developments of science. Surely,
this is a wondrous accomplishment—an accomplishment which occurs not occasionally, but many times every day.
John Edgar Hoover, Cooperation: The Key to Effective Law Enforcement in America, 12 SYR.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1960).
198. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1938: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 75th Cong. 81-82 (1937) (testimony of J. Edgar Hoover).
199. Maria Ponomarenko, The Department of Justice and the Limits of the New Deal
State, 1933-1945, at 177 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University),
https://perma.cc/2VV4-49J4 (quoting J. Edgar Hoover, M-Day for the FBI, ATLANTA
CONSTITUTION, Aug. 11, 1940, at B4).
200. YOU CAN’T GET AWAY WITH IT (FBI 1936), https://perma.cc/2VWL-E5E2; see LEE
GRIEVESON, CINEMA AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 303 (2017) (suggesting that the film
“sought to strengthen the protection of property and the policing of crimes against capital in
the early years of the Depression”); Richard Gid Powers, J. Edgar Hoover and the Detective
Hero, 9 J. POPULAR CULTURE 257, 274 (1975) (situating film in Hoover’s larger media strategy).
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the National Academy not only expanded its capacity and authority but also, as
Part III.A argues, sustained local police autonomy. Significantly, these projects
left little space for state governments in the policing realm. Part III.B next explores a policy path not taken, which could have given states more programmatic control over law enforcement matters. Finally, Part III.C examines the
consequences of collaborative federalism, namely, how it impeded the development of state and federal oversight mechanisms of local policing, and concludes with a call for reform in light of this history.
A. Sustaining local police at the expense of state authority
Tech entrepreneurs today would be familiar with what the Bureau did: it
essentially created a platform for the exchange of criminal information. As Lina
Khan illustrated with Amazon, the firm controlling a platform can eventually
gain competitive advantage when it also pursues the same sorts of business as
its platform users.201 But unlike the Amazon story, the Bureau was unlikely to
replace or take over the locals. Regardless of new criminal statutes or presidential orders that expanded its jurisdiction, and despite the Bureau’s efforts to
burnish its national status by making Big Cases on the backs of locals, its size
and structure precluded significant displacement of locals’ authority.202 In any
case, the Bureau showed no inclination in doing so and instead fostered the autonomy of local departments, which came, crucially, at the expense of state authority.
Legal scholars and historians, however, have overlooked the Bureau’s embrace of localism when assessing the federal government’s growing role in law
enforcement. Jurisprudential debates on whether a formal “anti-commandeering” doctrine mediates the relationship between federal and local agencies, and
whether the Rehnquist Court created that doctrine out of whole cloth in New
York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997), are merely academic.203 Operational or cooperative federalism has guaranteed that principle.
Cops don’t work for free, and neither do their departments. Throughout the
twentieth century, locals were able to negotiate their relationships with the feds

201. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 783 (2017); see
also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1051, 1087 (2017) (on risk that a platform will “leverag[e] its market position unfairly to establish a dominant position in other markets”).
202. At the outbreak of World War II, President Roosevelt issued an order—drafted by
Hoover after hearing that the New York Police Department intended to create a substantial
“special sabotage squad”—authorizing the Bureau “to take charge of investigative work in
matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.” The order
directed local police to “promptly turn over” to the Bureau any information relating to these
matters. THEOHARIS & COX, supra note 86, at 179-80.
203. See generally Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering
Cases, 574 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 158, 163-65 (2001); Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, The Tenth Amendment and the Federal Requisition Power:
New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (1998).
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from a position of informational strength.204 Their monopoly over local
knowledge that the feds needed to go after high-profile priorities served as
much as a guarantee against unwanted federal intervention as the political and
doctrinal safeguards that have been the subject of much scholarly discussion.205
Historians, meanwhile, have pointed to the Roosevelt administration as a
major turning point in the federal government’s involvement in the traditionally
local sphere of crime and punishment.206 Certainly, there were a busy few
years. In 1934, Congress passed nine crime bills, built Alcatraz prison and, for
the first time, authorized Bureau agents to carry guns and make arrests.207
Moreover, the war on crime enlarged the Bureau’s domain and did result in an
increase in manpower.208 To further demonstrate the federal government’s attention to the crime problem, national lawmakers rechristened the “Division of
Investigation” in 1935. It became the Federal Bureau of Investigation.209
But the collaborative relationship that the Bureau had forged with locals remained indispensable and was reaffirmed at the 1934 Attorney General’s Conference on Crime, the Roosevelt administration’s big event to demonstrate its
seriousness about the war on crime. One of the main agendas at the conference
was to clarify the national government’s role in criminal enforcement. According to Attorney General Cummings’s opening remarks, “Just how far the work
of the federal department should go and just what the form of interrelation between the agencies representing the state and federal governments should be, is,
of course, one of the crucial questions which faces us in this Conference.”210
One attendee, Earl Warren, then district attorney of Alameda County, California, maintained that “there must be an integration of all law enforcement activities” and that he wished “to see this done, not by transferring our local police
powers to the Federal Government nor by shifting the responsibility for maintaining law and order to Washington, D.C. but by bringing about a degree of

204. Daniel C. Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34
CRIME & JUST. 377 (2006); see also Trevor Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism, 19 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2019).
205. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
206. See, e.g., Frydl, supra note 139.
207. See Matthew G.T. Denney, “To Wage a War”: Crime, Race, and State Making in
the Age of FDR, 35 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 16, 29, 32, 40 (2021) (noting how Southern legislators played leadership roles in advancing the Administration’s “anticrime” agenda and in
blocking efforts to pass anti-lynching legislation).
208. Hoover informed the attorney general that he would need an additional 200 special
agents and 70 accountants, which would nearly double the Bureau’s count. But that was far
less than the additional 1,000 that presidential advisor Raymond Moley recommended. Stockham, supra note 53, at 142; Raymond Moley, Moley’s Report to Roosevelt on Law Enforcement Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1934 [hereinafter Moley’s Report].
209. See Stolberg, supra note 41, at 394; Frydl, supra note 139, at 20; Richman, supra
note 204, at 387-88.
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE ON
CRIME 4 (1934).
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cooperation and coordination of activity.”211 Bureau Director Hoover could not
agree more. The “best and only kind of a National Police which America will
tolerate,” he insisted, was “local officers with a knowledge of local conditions
and local criminals,” performing their duties with “the support of the Federal
Government.”212 To be sure, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York called for an end to local autonomy, but his call was limited to the prosecuting function.213 No one questioned the norm of local police autonomy.214
Neither did those in FDR’s orbit. Columbia law professor Raymond
Moley, whom Roosevelt tasked with devising a comprehensive criminal justice
policy, noted in his 1934 report to the president that “it is very important not to
permit the citizen or his local government to get the idea that the suppression of
crime will be entirely assumed by Federal enforcement machinery.”215 As
Moley described the administration’s crime program, the goal was not “that the
United States Government should supersede State authorities,” but only “to
give Federal authorities the power to cooperate with local forces when necessary.”216 In addition, Attorney General Cummings justified FDR’s crime bills
by focusing on the “twilight zone,” the area in “between the jurisdictions of the
Federal and State Governments” where “the predatory criminal takes hopeful
refuge.”217 Assuring those wary of federal overreach, Cummings avowed that
the “Federal Government has no desire to extend its jurisdiction beyond cases
in which, due to the nature of the crime itself, it is impossible for the States adequately to protect themselves.”218 True to his promise that crime fighting
would remain primarily a local responsibility, Cummings promptly demanded
the resignation of the chief of the criminal division who had publicly proposed
a plan to place all municipal and state law enforcement officers under the US
Justice Department.219
To be sure, the desire to strengthen the role of states also figured prominently in the Administration’s program. To underscore its commitment to keep
211. Id. at 322.
212. Id. at 25-26.
213. The U.S. Attorney sought “the creation of genuine state departments of justice”

with appointed leaders to supersede local, elected prosecutors, in line with American Bar Association recommendations at the time. Id. at 186.
214. See Earl H. De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General in Criminal
Prosecution, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 258, 393 (1934) (noting absence of proposals “for
the centralization of police control in the state government”).
215. Moley’s Report, supra note 208. Howe, while favoring an “American Scotland
Yard,” nonetheless recognized “the broad bar of a fundamental constitutional provision in regard to police powers.” He explained that a national police force presented “one of the ways
in which the Federal Government can help, not by usurping any of the state police powers, but
coming . . . upon the invitation of the local authorities.” Howe, supra note 139, at 71; see also
Stolberg, supra note 41, at 399.
216. Moley’s Report, supra note 208.
217. Attorney General Outlines, supra note 148, at 2.
218. Id. at 3.
219. See Stolberg, supra note 41, at 400-02; G. Jack Benge, Jr., Partners in Crime: Federal Crime Control Policy and the States, 1894-1938, at 458 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University), https://perma.cc/BP2Z-V8NG.
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the national government’s role as limited as possible, one of Cummings’s
“twelve point plan for crime prevention” included a provision giving blanket
congressional consent to interstate compacts “for cooperative effort and mutual
assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective
criminal laws and policies.”220 This proposal was first introduced in 1932 during the tenure of President Hoover, a staunch localist. Introducing the bill, Representative Sumners had pointed out that there was “just one of two things” that
the federal government could do in response to crimes carried out across state
lines: either send criminal functions “back to the States” or “reconcile ourselves
to be governed by a great Federal bureaucracy.”221 He sought to do the former
by giving “two sovereign States the privilege of entering into any agreement
they want to, to protect their citizens against people who ought to be shot on
sight.”222 A critical part of FDR’s legislative package was thus a measure to
contain the federal law enforcement apparatus by encouraging coordination
among the states.223
After the passage of the Crime Control Compact Consent Act of 1934, the
states got to work. In 1935, they established the Interstate Commission on
Crime, and delegates to its inaugural conference met “to discuss ways and
means of overcoming loopholes in the criminal laws [and] in our law-enforcement structure”—the “twilight zone” that Cummings had identified.224 They
came together to draft interstate compacts as well as uniform laws that would
standardize the handling of cases with a multi-state aspect. The Interstate Commission recommended model legislation on extradition, the rendition of witnesses, the supervision of parolees who frequently moved from one state to another, and more.
Significantly, none of the uniform laws sought to interfere with local law
enforcement. The closest that the Commission came to stepping on local functions was its consideration of crime prevention, where it recognized that most
causes of crime stemmed from breakdowns in the family or neighborhood unit
and, accordingly, that solutions to the problem would be local as well.225 Still,
the Commission refrained from getting too involved, and the only role it saw
for itself, as a body representing the states, was to serve as a “clearing house for
the gathering and dissemination” of information on successful community programs, such as juvenile courts and juvenile training institutions.226 While the
Commission also endorsed the creation of “protective police” dedicated to “the
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
75 CONG. REC. 8423 (1932) (statement of Rep. Sumners).
Id.
Crime Control Compact Consent Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 909 (now 4 U.S.C. § 112
(2003)). The 1935 Attorney General’s Report noted that while this legislation “is of sole concern to the State governments,” the Department “has had occasion to cooperate, in an unofficial manner, with State authorities anxious to take advantage of its provisions.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1935).
224. INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL
11 (1942).
225. Id. at 118-27.
226. Id. at 127.

460

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[17:421

needs and habits of youth,” it stopped short of recommending any action on the
part of the states.227 Ultimately, interstate compacts and uniform laws left local
police agencies alone.
B. A policy path not taken
Even if no one contemplated that states would manage some local responsibilities, it could have happened indirectly had the Roosevelt administration’s
promotion of interstate compacts come with financial grants-in-aid that would
have given states more programmatic control over policing.228 This was a significant road not taken. As Jon Teaford observed, the federal government can
empower states by making them, not localities, the recipients of federal funding.229 For example, the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 strengthened the control
of state administrators over local highway construction and maintenance by
funneling grants through the states.230 Thanks to federal money, most states by
1940 had assumed complete responsibility for primary highways and, in some
states, for all highway systems.231 And Karen Tani has shown how federal aid
fostered similar dynamics during the New Deal with respect to welfare policy,
another traditionally local matter.232 As Martha Derthick wrote of federal policy
for highways and poor relief during this period, “Grant-in-aid conditions were
above all delocalizing—quite deliberately so.”233

227. Id. at 125.
228. See MILLSPAUGH, supra note 71, at 49-50 (noting that the “federal government has

not yet made use of financial grants-in-aid to assist the states in their criminal-law enforcement
work, but it has sought by other means to strengthen, co-ordinate, and supplement state effort.”); POTTER, supra note 145, at 187 (suggesting Hoover helped kill grant proposals); Donald C. Stone, Reorganization for Police Protection, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 451, 456-57
(1934) (suggesting that a federal grant-in-aid system might be developed but counseling
against leaving standard setting to the more “political” state governments); see also Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, 690 (1925). (“Following the English device of grantsin-aid, the Federal government has latterly sought to stimulate through financial assistance
State action in matters subject to State control but involving an interest common to the whole
country.”).
229. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES 7-8 (2002).
230. Id. at 34; see also id. at 100 (noting that as a result of the 1916 Act and the Federal
Highway Act of 1921, “[t]he states were in charge of constructing the highways of the automobile age”).
231. M. HARRY SATTERFIELD, COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY STATES 55 (1940); see also V.O. KEY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
GRANTS TO STATES 34-42 (1937).
232. KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY 8 (2016); see also John J. Wallis & Wallace Oates, The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism 155, 170-71, in THE
DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White, eds., 1998) (“Not only
were New Deal programs administered at the state level, but state governments in particular
possessed real decision-making power.”).
233. DERTHICK, supra note 9, at 15.
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Yet, the converse played out for criminal law enforcement. No effort materialized to erode “the bedrock of localism,” as Derthick put it, even though the
federal government could have put serious money on the table, for instance, to
assist states in facilitating their own extradition arrangements.234 Although the
Constitution’s Extradition Clause already provided for the return of fugitives
from one state to another, it was largely defunct because of the “asylum” state’s
oft-abused discretion in refusing extradition requests, the inefficiencies of extradition processes, and lack of funds.235 The Interstate Commission tried to
overcome these difficulties with the Uniform Extradition Act and even drafted
standardized forms that states could use. But the sensitive matter of determining which state, the requesting or the receiving one, would pay for transferring
arrestees continued to hinder interstate coordination.236
The Roosevelt administration not only failed to materially promote statecoordinated extraditions, but it also likely undermined state efforts with the Fugitive Felon Act, another part of its 1934 legislative package. The new law provided a substitute for extradition that essentially adopted the mechanisms of the
Bureau’s informational platform and cut out state actors.237 Under the new regime, the Bureau would use federal charges to obtain jurisdiction over fleeing
felons and then turn them over to the local authorities seeking them. The Bu-

234. See id. at 17 (noting how “[n]othing that occurred before midcentury diminished
the localism of police departments or . . . schools” neither of which had been “the beneficiary
(or victim) of federal aid”).
235. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, supra note 224, at 20-21.
See Henry S. Toy & Edmund Shepherd, The Problem of Fugitive Felons and Witnesses, 1
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 415, 419 (1934); see also United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65,
67 (W.D. Ky. 1936) (in upholding Fugitive Felon Act against constitutional attack, the court
noted: “It is now possible, and crime is often committed in one state and the participants within
a few hours are entirely out of reach of state authorities. The right of extradition guaranteed to
the states by the federal government becomes too slow as a vehicle for swift punishment of
criminals, and oftentimes any punishment at all.”); William T. Plumb, Jr., Illegal Enforcement
of the Law, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1939) (noting that because of the discretionary
authority allowed to governors under current extradition procedures, “there is a temptation to
ignore its requirements and forcibly return the fugitive to the offended state, frequently with
the open connivance of the officers of the state where he is found”).
236. Section 24 of the Uniform Extradition Act, on “costs and expenses”—more specifically, on who would pay the costs and expenses and how much—was the only provision of
the act that the drafters put in brackets to indicate that it would necessarily “vary with the
different states.” INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, supra note 224, at 28-29.
237. Attorney General Cummings testified:
One of the most difficult problems which local law-enforcement agencies have to
deal with today is the ease with which criminals are able to flee from the State to
avoid prosecution . . . . The [Fugitive Felon Act] is considered the most satisfactory
solution to this problem, which the States have never been able to solve effectively.
This [Act] . . . will not prevent the States from obtaining extradition of roving criminals, but the complicated process of extradition has proved to be very inefficient.
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1458 (1934); S. REP. NO. 73-2253 (1934), quoted in Samuel L. Bare, III,
Federal Assistance in the Enforcement of State Criminal Law, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163
(1960); see also Brevard E. Crihfield & Mitchell Wendell, Crime Control and the Uniformity
of Criminal Laws, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 574 (1952).
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reau having played its keystone role, federal charges would then be dismissed.238 The law was first used against two sisters who fled to avoid testifying against their brother in his trial for the murder of one sister’s husband.239
Hoover soon touted the Bureau’s ability “to render extensive assistance to local
authorities by making available its Nation-wide facilities in searches for fugitives” who had committed local offenses.240 The important takeaway here is
that it was the feds, not the states, to whom locals were indebted.
The Fugitive Felon Act was well received, even by those who otherwise
might have been opposed to federal intervention. The Interstate Commission’s
“Handbook,” which compiled all the uniform laws and interstate compacts, also
included an essay by the US attorney general’s assistant that celebrated the new
law, even as the Commission encouraged states to adopt the Uniform Extradition Act.241 Southerners also appreciated how the law would allow them to circumvent the sensibilities of a rendering jurisdiction, at least when the feds were
willing. For instance, it enabled a county sheriff in Georgia to obtain custody of
an African American who fled to New York to avoid being lynched, despite
New York Governor Lehman’s refusal to “even entertain” an extradition request unless charges against the man were reduced.242 Issues of gubernatorial
discretion continued to dog the interstate rendition process in later years, but
the availability of federal circumvention made cooperative resolution among
the states unnecessary.243
In time, federal block grants under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of
1965 and the Safe Street Acts of 1968 would pour money into both state and local law enforcement efforts, which had the potential to expand the criminal justice bureaucracy at the state level.244 But governors generally stayed out of the
planning process.245 The separation of centralized “formal law-making agen-

238. Bare, supra note 237, at 164-65.
239. Fugitive Sisters Jailed by New Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1935, at 32.
240. Report of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. DEP’T OF

JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 129 (1936).
241. Gordon Dean, Recent Extensions of Federal Criminal Law, in INTERSTATE COMM’N
ON CRIME, supra note 224, at 143 (1942).
242. Lindbergh Law Invoked to Win Extradition of Lynching Fugitive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1939, at 21; Georgia Calls on Lindbergh Law to Extradite Lynching Fugitive, N.Y.
HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 1939, at 21A (noting role of sheriff). Echoes of the Fugitive Slave
Act are hard to miss here. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 110-47 (1970) (on role of federal personnel).
243. See Note, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion,
66 YALE L.J. 97, 113 (1956).
244. Vesla M. Weaver, The Significance of Policy Failures: The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Growth of the Carceral State, in LIVING LEGISLATION:
DURABILITY, CHANGE, AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN LAWMAKING 221, 228 (Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Eric Patashnik eds., 2012).
245. A report from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations noted:
The Governor . . . is often not in a position to respond to public expectations because
so much of law enforcement is handled locally, and because of the dispersion of
State responsibility among the attorney general—usually separately elected—the
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cies”—legislatures and state court systems—from locally controlled “police enforcement processes” remained undisturbed.246 As Michael Campbell concluded, “no wholesale rethinking of how to organize and coordinate state and
local criminal justice systems occurred in most states,” and local jurisdictions
were left “with ample leeway in determining how to enforce the law.”247
What explains the failure to promote state authority with federal aid? Perhaps the states’ relatively small role was overdetermined. Criminal information
is usually gathered locally, which tends to pull authority down to the lowest
levels even in the most centralized policing regimes.248 In addition, Americans’
commitment to localized criminal justice ran deep, and ideological concerns
about centralized police also applied to state police. Although Pennsylvania established a state force in 1905, few were quick to follow suit.249 As a result,
state police forces were underdeveloped latecomers in the 1930s, when most
states finally established them to enforce traffic and highway safety laws and
not to perform general police functions.250 Even then, state police generally
stayed out of urban areas and relied on local police when they needed to find a
witness or suspect across corporate boundaries.251 In the South, unease that
governors, likely more attentive to the state’s reputation beyond, would unduly
intrude on local norms of white supremacy only reinforced resistance to state
centralization.252
courts, and the legislature. Even such basically executive functions as are found in
corrections and State police or highway patrol may not always be under the Governor’s effective control because of constitutional or statutory provisions.
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 251 (1971); see Robert F. Diegelman, Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control: Lessons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
994, 1002-03 (1982); ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SAFE STREETS
RECONSIDERED: THE BLOCK GRANT EXPERIENCE 1968-1975, at 60 (1977).
246. Parrett, supra note 183, at 155; see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE
POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION 5-6 (1980) (noting how Safe Streets Act of 1968 failed to lead to institutions
with “the authority and expertise to significantly alter traditional crime fighting strategies”).
247. Michael C. Campbell, Varieties of Mass Incarceration: What We Learn from State
Histories, 1 ANN. REV. CRIM. 219, 227 (2018).
248. See Otwin Marenin, Police Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy in
the Exercise of Coercion, 18 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 101, 107-09 (1985) (on the “work of
policing”).
249. See supra note 35.
250. See generally H. KENNETH BECHTEL, STATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1995); Major Lynn G. Adams, The State Police, 146 ANNALS
AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 34 (1929).
251. Bruce Smith, Factors Influencing the Future Development of State Police, 23 J.
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 713, 715 (1932). But see id. at 716 (noting that state police were
more ready to take an active hand when pursuing matters overlapping with the jurisdiction of
rural police departments).
252. See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 31, 41 (1995) (noting how after
Alabama Governor Bibb Graves used the State Law Enforcement Department to investigate
and prevent lynchings between 1926 and 1930, the Department became an issue in the 1930
gubernatorial election; Graves lost, and his successor abolished the Department).
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And while portrayals of J. Edgar Hoover as the indomitable bureaucratic
warrior may be overstated, he could not have been pleased when commentators
heralding interstate compacts further envisioned that states might even “establish a joint crime detection laboratory and fingerprint bureau, or even a joint
police force.”253 Were state authorities to replace the feds as the critical interlocutors with local police departments, the Bureau’s standing would indeed
have been affected. Hoover took this risk quite seriously. According to former
assistant director William Sullivan, the agency
maintained a blacklist of police departments euphemistically called the
‘Restricted List.’ A law enforcement agency placed on the Restricted
List may find itself completely cut off from the services of the FBI
Lab. The quickest and surest way for a local department to be placed
on the Restricted list was to criticize the efficiency of the FBI or to encourage the establishment of independent regional labs.254
The Bureau continued to cement its position within the national law enforcement system by removing potential competition, just as it had once eliminated competing fingerprint registries by acquiring the IACP and Leavenworth
databases.255
For all of these reasons, and perhaps also because of path dependency, federal criminal legislation remained the default solution to interstate coordination
problems throughout the twentieth century.256 A recent example is the 1992
Child Support Recovery Act, which solved the interstate problem of “deadbeat
dads” who reside outside the jurisdiction of a state seeking to recover child support.257 Unlike auto thefts, child support cases didn’t fill the federal docket, but
the nature of the response was similar to the Dyer Act and the Fugitive Felon
Act. These laws relieved states from having to fashion coordination strategies

253. CQ RESEARCHER, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1934),
https://perma.cc/ZP4A-FYA4.
254. SULLIVAN, supra note 169, at 98.
255. Antitrust lawyers will be familiar with how control of an “essential facility” can
allow exploitation or preclusion of competitors. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities
Doctrine, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010).
256. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME &
JUST. (MOD. POLICING) 51, 64 (1992) (“Pressures toward consolidation, coordination, and integration of local law enforcement encounter substantial resistance as they run counter to the
prevailing ideals of local government in the United States. The decentralization of power, authority, and decision making within organizations conforms to the ideals of democratic government and remains the dominant ideology in law enforcement.”).
257. Child Support Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 228(a), 106 Stat. 3403 (1992)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 228) (reflecting 1998 upgrade of offense from a misdemeanor to a felony). See also Catherine Wimberly, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Mom, and Uncle
Sam: How the Child Support Recovery Act Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 729, 766 (2000) (arguing for elimination of federal criminal enforcement regime because
“states are more than capable and are ultimately more effective in catching and convicting the
most hard-core of child-support evaders”).
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and gave localities the means to surmount jurisdictional challenges without any
state mediation, all the while building federal capacity.
C. The consequences of collaborative federalism and possible reforms
Federal criminal laws and resources that fostered collaborative relations
with locals came with troubling structural consequences that are front and center today. One was the federal government’s reluctance to interfere with local
law enforcement. Even where the Bureau had the legislative authority to act, it
often exercised its discretion not to, especially when cases touched on racial
matters sensitive to local politics.258 When the NAACP appealed to Roosevelt
to use the federal kidnapping law to prosecute two southern lynchings in which
the victims had been transported over state lines, Attorney General Cummings
advised the president that doing so would be inappropriate absent more authority from Congress.259 But Cummings, committed to keeping southern support
for the war on crime, also pointedly refused to push for an anti-lynching law,
explaining that “the problem of lynching was ‘a purely local one and it must be
handled as such.’”260
In 1946, in the wake of a bloody race riot in Columbia, Tennessee, Thurgood Marshall, then special counsel to the NAACP, wrote to Attorney General
Tom Clark complaining that even though the NAACP’s “inexperienced investigators” were “usually” able to identify those involved in recent lynchings and
mob violence against African Americans, the Bureau seemed unable to do so.
The Bureau, Marshall noted, had a “great record” from the prosecution “of vicious spies and saboteurs … to nondescript hoodlums who steal cheap automobiles and drive them across state lines.” But somehow the Bureau had been
“unable to identify or bring to trial persons charged with violations of federal
statutes where Negroes are the victims.”261 The Bureau’s priorities could not

258. See supra note 151. Roosevelt advisor Raymond Moley recognized that the new
federal criminal laws “practically assumes [federal] jurisdiction in all cases of bank robbery
or burglary” and that this was “a very considerable extension of Federal responsibility.” He
acknowledged that ensuring the proper division of local and federal responsibilities would
have to “be found in an attempt to operate the bill” and “depend upon the wisdom with which
its enforcement is attended.” That “wisdom” would be the discretion of Hoover and the Bureau, sometimes with guidance from the attorney general, to determine when to intervene and
which cases to leave to the locals. See Moley’s Report, supra note 208.
259. Elliff, supra note 58, at 69-70; see also MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND
SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN
SOUTH 19 (1987). Eventually, in 1951, the Civil Rights Section revisited its constrained reading of the kidnapping act and successfully used it against Carolina Klan members who kidnapped two African Americans. United States v. Brooks, 199 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1952); Elliff,
supra note 58, at 302.
260. Elliff, supra note 58, at 67-68; see also Jenkins et al., supra note 58, at 79-82 (on
efforts by Northern Democrats to pass anti-lynching legislation in 1934).
261. Letter from Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP LDF, to Tom C. Clark,
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 27, 1941) (on file with vault.fbi, Thurgood Marshall, Section 4, Serial No.
62-86660); see PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA 432-33 (2002) (citing letter); id. at 370-74 (describing violence in Columbia and
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have been clearer when, in 1946, Justice Department officials pushed the Bureau to investigate the lynching of four African Americans in Monroe, Georgia.
Director Hoover balked, citing overload from other cases and the limits of his
statutory authority.262
DOJ and its Bureau were well aware of local pressure points. When, in
1959, the Eisenhower Administration tried to extend the Fugitive Felon Act to
cover those wanted for school and church bombings that were a violent part of
the massive resistance to desegregation decrees, DOJ officials took pains to reassure legislators that local, not federal, authorities would pursue these atrocities. As Attorney General Rogers emphasized, the Bureau would assist, “not supersede local law enforcement agencies.”263 For good measure, he also pointed
out that of the 947 fugitives that the Bureau had located in fiscal year 1957,
only nine faced charges in federal court.264 Although the 1959 effort failed, the
Kennedy Administration was able to obtain an even broader extension of the
Act in 1961. Still, Congress, not content to rely on the executive branch’s assurances, explicitly prohibited federal prosecution absent exceptional circumstances.265 This limiting provision was unnecessary, for the Bureau’s operational reliance on locals ensured that the civil rights probes that it did launch
were episodic and exceptional. Ultimately, the Bureau’s commitment to local
agencies overshadowed any interest in monitoring the police.
In time, the Bureau, spurred by changing national priorities, would develop
more of a civil rights agenda and, at least in the most egregious cases, overcome its structural reluctance to investigate police violence.266 But because the
Bureau’s primary focus has been on crime control and only secondarily on constitutional and equitable policing, the federal role in promoting the latter has
been limited. Certainly, the Bureau has not been the only federal interlocutor
with local departments, and federal funding programs administered by other

how, after the FBI failed to identify white suspects, Marshall was nearly lynched while representing some of the black defendants).
262. Elliff, supra note 58, at 223-35.
263. Proposals to Secure, Protect and Strengthen Civil Rights of Persons under the Constitution and Laws of the United States: Hearings on S. 435, 456, 499 Before the S. Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary Pt. 1, 86th Cong. 190 (1959) (statement of Attorney General William P. Rogers).
264. By this point, the feds could not be counted on to mindlessly deploy their authority
to reinforce white supremacy. In 1955, South Carolina Governor Bell Timmerman, Jr., condemned Attorney General Brownell’s “discriminat[ory]” refusal to use the Fugitive Felon Act
against civil rights leader Reverend J.A. DeLaine, who had fled the state after defending his
house against night raiders. Brownell, the Governor complained, was “using the integration
issue to promote his Republican politics.” U.S. Won’t Arrest Carolina Pastor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1955, at 20; see Sue Anne Pressley, After 45 Years, S.C. Pioneer Of Civil Rights Is
Cleared, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2000), https://perma.cc/AAP3-M5V2.
265. Positions in Top Grades of Classification Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 87-368 62
(1961).
266. See Paul J. Watford, Screws v. United States and the Birth of Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 477 (2014); RICHMAN, supra note 54, at 442-44, 448-51
(noting relative infrequency of federal civil rights prosecutions of police).
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agencies might have been used to spur police reform.267 But as Rachel Harmon
has noted, “[b]eyond the usual requirements for monitoring spending and complying with federal antidiscrimination law, federal public safety programs do
little to promote lawfulness, accountability, or fairness in policing.”268 To be
sure, the federal government has made some, albeit limited, efforts to constrain
local autonomy.269 In the mid-1990s after the police beating of Rodney King,
Congress authorized the Justice Department to pursue institutional change in
departments with “patterns or practices” of unconstitutional conduct.270 But
backsliding remains an issue, and the sustainability of court-ordered reforms
over the long term is an open question.271
What little that the federal government did, however, paled in consequence
with what the states did not do. The Bureau’s direct relationships with police
departments and the paltry federal resources put towards constraining local police autonomy undermined state influence and undercut any state oversight that
might have developed. This history helps explain why, to this day, governors
and other state-level actors still lack authority over policing, or, if they have it,
are slow to use it.272 To be sure, states are involved in penal matters like prison
construction and decriminalization.273 But that involvement has rarely extended
directly to criminal enforcement operations.274 While states provide penal laws
267. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016).
268. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 870, 890 (2015); see Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 55–56 (2012).
269. Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 268, at 872; see also Jeremy Stahl, How
the Trump Administration Undid Obama’s Response to Ferguson, SLATE, June 2, 2020.
270. See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3189 (2014); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
271. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Twenty Years of DOJ “Pattern or Practice” Investigations
of Local Police: Achievements, Limitations, and Questions (Feb. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://perma.cc/KFZ3-8UXW.
272. Other factors are at work too. See Eliot H. Lumbard, State and Local Government
Crime Control, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 895 (1968) (“By and large, state governments
minimized their crime control responsibilities until the past five years or so.”); DANIEL L.
SKOLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATION, FINANCING, AND STRUCTURE: ESSAYS AND
EXPLORATIONS 75 (1978) (“Direct consolidation or centralized supervision of criminal justice
functions has largely been ignored as a coordinating mechanism, partly because of the constitutional separation of powers, partly because of the fractionalization of law enforcement between state, county and local government, partly because of legitimate needs for autonomy of
certain components vis-a-vis others, and partly because recent consolidation of state government functions has tended to place criminal justice units in other governmental service groupings.”).
273. Cf. Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483 (2017);
see Reiss, supra note 256 (“Coordination is largely voluntary with only occasional formal
arrangements among local governments through the institution of contract policing, the setting
of minimum standards for policing, or the institution of state-mandated training.”).
274. There are noteworthy exceptions, including the Baltimore City Police Department,
which remains a state agency. See Luke Broadwater, Bill to End State Control of Baltimore
Police Won’t Pass This Year After Opposition from City Senators, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 5,
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and prisons, counties and municipalities still manage the rest of the criminal
justice system, from deciding who gets prosecuted for what to determining how
police and prosecutors interact with the communities they serve. Cogent calls
for statewide administrative supervision are regularly heard but to little avail.275
As a result, local police practices have largely developed without any significant state or federal oversight, with destructive consequences on communities of color.276 Take, for instance, the Ferguson Police Department, which
preyed on the poorest, most disadvantaged members of the community in
search of fines, fees, and forfeitures to subsidize municipal coffers.277 Officials
in St. Louis defended the patchwork of sixty different police departments
against proposals to consolidate, claiming that “keeping it local” ensured that
each community’s needs were heard and addressed.278 But a report by a police
reform group observed that “some of these departments were the same ones
where community policing is neglected in favor of revenue generation, and
where many residents do not trust the police.”279 The report also highlighted the
lack of state oversight, noting that Missouri had underfunded and understaffed
a state program intended to end the “muni shuffle,” which refers to the reassignment of problem officers to different departments, usually to those “in the
poorest, often high-crime communities.”280 These problems are not limited to
Ferguson, as reports of other cities and counties make clear.281 With states generally leaving local governments to fund departments primarily through local
2019, 12:15 PM), https://perma.cc/CNT5-8YYC; George Nilson, Baltimore Police Under
State Control for Good Reason, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:28 AM),
https://perma.cc/7QC3-JAD6; see also Editorial, Why Doesn’t KC Control Its Own Police Department? It’s Past Time to Tackle This Issue, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/U5PX-QC94 (noting that although the Missouri legislature finally returned
Kansas City police department to local control in 2013, control remains in the hands of a commission (which includes the mayor) appointed by the governor).
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sales and property taxes,282 all too many localities throughout the country have
relied on traffic fines and court fees disproportionately exacted on the poor and
people of color to supplement meager budgets. Moreover, the “wandering officer”—substandard, even dangerous, officers bounced from department to department—is a nationwide problem.283
A road not taken in the 1930s—federal support for state-based criminal databases—was to some extent taken after 9/11 with intelligence fusion centers
established around the country,284 and state governments have created their own
DNA databases that are not governed by the strict restrictions of the CODIS
system that the FBI controls.285 But, perversely, local police have long pointed
to the availability of state-provided infrastructure and centralized services to
justify their continued independence.286 For their part, states have done comparatively little to address racialized and unequal policing.
But that may be changing.287 Although top-down initiatives may not have
been as effective as activists would like, grassroots political movements may
make a difference by pushing states to assume responsibilities that have long
been rejected or unrecognized. Responding to the furor over Ferguson, the Missouri legislature, supported by the governor, reduced the cap on general operating revenue that a municipality could collect from traffic tickets, from 30 percent to 20 percent, in an effort to rein in abusive local practices.288 Connecticut
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barred local police forces from hiring officers dismissed for misconduct by
other state agencies, as well as those who resigned to avoid dismissal.289 Most
recently, in the wake of George Floyd’s death, which set off protests worldwide, the Minnesota attorney general took over the prosecution of the officers
charged with his murder at the behest of the state’s governor, legislators, and
members of the victim’s family.290 Also in response to the protests, New York
and Iowa empowered their attorneys general to investigate police-involved
deaths,291 Colorado set limits on police use of force and mandated data collection to crack down on wandering officers,292 Massachusetts established a statewide police certification regime,293 and Maryland repealed its “Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights.”294 The Trump administration’s withdrawal from
the already limited federal oversight itself spurred some state governments to
step up to embrace structural reform.295 In California, the state attorney general
is now overseeing the reform of the San Francisco Police Department and has
statutory authority to bring other “pattern or practice” cases.296
In addition to these steps, states could also allocate funds to police departments based on need instead of on local tax receipts and require departments to
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earmark a part of their budgets for officer training and accountability
measures.297 State governments surely don’t have a monopoly on virtue, and
some might be quite hostile to reform.298 But they could develop effective
mechanisms for overcoming local police pathologies and catalyzing change.
Importantly, as the historical account told in this Article suggests, these efforts can be further aided with federal funding given directly to the states and
tied to local compliance with minimum policing standards. We may yet see this
play out under the Biden/Harris administration, which has articulated a clear
commitment to police reform, a readiness to bring “pattern or practice” cases,
and, importantly, an interest in funding incentives.299 These had made up critical parts of the George Floyd Justice in Policing bill, which failed in Congress
after bipartisan talks collapsed.300 One provision would have conditioned federal grants on local departments’ contribution of data to a new National Police
Misconduct Registry – a development that, along with data collection on law
enforcement practices, including the use of deadly force, would finally put the
federal informational infrastructure in service of regulating the police and not
just of crime control.301 Another provision of the bill would have allowed state
attorneys to bring “pattern and practice” cases in federal court and provide
grants to support investigations to that end.
It remains to be seen whether the states or the federal government can
overcome the discrimination and inequality that will always be the dark side of
local autonomy.302 Left to their own devices, governors and legislators may be
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reluctant to change historical expectations and to take on accountability for local policing.303 Indeed, they have often declined to do so by caving to anti-reform police union lobbying.304 But political risks can change, particularly if
federal data collection efforts highlight local inadequacies.305 If recent events
offer any indication, local protest movements may be the necessary, even if not
sufficient, factor in countering the endurance, and pathologies, of localism.
This Article suggests that reformers may find it far more efficient, and perhaps
even more effective, to target their efforts at federal and state authorities even
as they continue efforts to hold local officials to account.
As Patrick Joyce and Chandra Mukerji have urged, we should see “the
state not as a thing but as a shape-shifting assemblage of people and things.”306
Far from being a unitary actor, it is “at heart a communication complex and territorial entity, one that keeps reweaving the fabric of government with changing
lines of communication and different ways of managing problems of distance.”
While police forces may be a permanent fixture of law enforcement,307 protestors and progressive state governments can reweave the fabric of government
by claiming their positions in the criminal justice system.
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